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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1997 - March 1998
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the
supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of issues that the supreme court has
addressed, as well as to serve as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney
discipline, judicial misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected California Supreme
Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the legal
implications of cases in a concise format.
I. APPELLATE REVIEW
The accelerated time frame of thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal to
a final judgement in a cause of action involving the validity of agreements
entered into by public bodies also applies to appealable orders entered in
those validation actions.
Planning and Conservation League v. Department of Water
R esources . ............................................... 438
II. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. California Civil Code section 52.1, which authorizes suit against anyone for
threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes with the exercise or enjoyment
of rights under federal or state law, regardless of whether the offender acted
under color of law, requires an attempted or completed act of interference with
the legal right, accompanied by aform of coercion; however, this section does
not apply to a private actor's putative violations of legal guaranties that only
limit the state's power.
Jones v. K-M art Corp . .................................... 442
B. A California district attorney acts on behalf of the state when prosecuting and
preparing to prosecute criminal violations of state law, as well as when
establishing policy and training employees in these areas, and hence a county
is not subject to § 1983 liability for the prosecutor's actions in that regard.
Pitts v. County of Kern ..................................... 447,
Im. COSTS
A. "Reasonable attorney fees and costs" may be awarded to the successful party
in a Fair Employment and Housing Act pursuant to Government Code section
12965 (b) to the exclusion offees of an expert not ordered by the court unless
there is express law authorizing the award of such fees.
Davis v. KGO-T.V . ....................................... 451
B. A party in whose favor a voluntary dismissal has been given may recover
attorney fees in accordance with a contract provision awarding attorney fees
as long as the original claim was that of tort, not contract.
Santisas v. Goodin . ........................................ 455
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Evidence of two separate enumerated criminal acts on the same occasion, one
committed by the defendant and the other by a member of the defendant's
gang, are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of California Penal
Code section 186.22. Thus, crimes committed by two or more persons on the
same occasion are sufficient to establish a "pattern of criminal gang activity."
People v. Louen . ........................................... 458
B. A trial court's discretion to vacate a prior felony conviction" in furtherance
of justice, "pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 (a), is subject to review for
abuse of discretion, and the court must set forth its reasons for the dismissal
in an order entered in the minutes; if the decision to vacate is based on a guilty
plea and reversed on appeal, the defendant may return to the status quo at
remand by withdrawing his plea.
People v. W illiams . ........................................ 462
C. A criminal defendant offered no evidence that his alleged mental disability
rendered him unable to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights;
thus, the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence pretrial statements
the defendant made to the police after he waived his Miranda rights.,
Furthermore, the trial court's admission of the defendant's poor driving
record into evidence was harmless error because the defendant's own
statements to the police eliminated any reasonable probability that the jury's
verdict would have been different had the evidence of the defendant's poor
driving record been excluded.
People v. W hitson . ......................................... 465
D. A sentencing court has the discretion to strike prior felony convictions under
the "three strikes" law while in the presence of the defendant and his counsel.
People v. Rodriguez . ...................................... 471
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E. Law enforcement personnel may temporarily seize a dwelling by restricting
access to it where there is reasonable suspicion that contraband or other
evidence is on the premises.
People v. Bennett . ........................................ 474
F. The trier offact may consider an appellate opinion, in general, as part of the
record of conviction when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies
under the sentencing scheme at issue. The court must perform an ad hoc
analysis based on the facts of the case to determine the probative value of the
appellate opinion.
People v. W oodell . ......................................... 479
V. DELINQUENT, DEPENDENT, AND NEGLIGENT CHILDREN
Courts have authority to create hearsay exceptions not established in the
California Code of Evidence; therefore, the "child dependency hearsay
exception" created in a prior judicial proceeding is a valid exception to the
hearsay rule. However, this exception must be modified to include a valid
determination of reliability based on (1) an examination of the time, circum-
stances, and content of the statement which might provide specific indicia of
reliability, (2) opportunity for cross-examination of the child declarant or
independent corroboration of the statement, and (3) adequate notice of
intended hearsay use given to interested parties. Furthermore, a finding of
testimonial incompetence of the child is not a categorical bar to the admission
of the child's prior statement.
In re Cindy L. v. Edgar L ................................... 483
VI. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
The imposition of contempt sanctions against a parent who refuses to pay child
support is not aform of involuntary servitude proscribed by the United States
and California constitutions because requiring a parent to seek some sort of
employment does not bind the parent to any one type of employment or
employer, nor is the imposition of contempt sanctions for failure to pay child
support unconstitutional as an imprisonment for debt because failure to pay
falls under an implied fraud exception to the proscription against imprison-
ment for debt.
M oss v. Superior Ct . ...................................... 487
VII. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
A jury's role in a trial for breach of an implied employment contract, where
the employee can be discharged for good cause only, is to decide whether the
employer acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing
misconduct occurred.
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc ........................ 492
VIII. INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND COVERAGE
Site investigation expenses constitute defense costs that the insurer incurs in
fulfilling its duty to defend if- (1) the site investigation is conducted between
tender of the defense and conclusion of the action; (2) the site investigation
constitutes a reasonable and necessary effort to avoid or at least minimize
liability; and (3) the site investigation expenses are reasonable and necessary
for that purpose. Additionally, defense costs may be allocated to the insured
if the costs related to a claim that is not even potentially covered under the
insurance policy.
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co ................. 496
IX. MUNICIPALITIES
California Vehicle Code section 40200.5 (a), prohibiting the contracting of
parking violations to another city processing agency in an outside county, is
not violated when the outside agency simply contracts to provide limited
service assistance. In order to be prohibited by section 40200.5 (a) as a
processing agency, the issuing agent must transfer a "comprehensive package
of responsibilities" to the outside agency.
Lockheed Info. Management Serv. Co. v. City of Inglewood ...... 501
X. PARENT AND CHILD
Pursuant to Probate Code section 6454, the estate of a decedent may pass to
a foster child or stepchild if the foster or steprelationship began during the
child's minority and continued through the joint lifetimes of the decedent and
child and if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the child
would have been adopted but for a legal barrier which began during the
child's minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the child and
the decedent.
Estate of Joseph . ......................................... 505
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XI. UNFAIR COMPETITION
A private for-profit corporation may maintain, on beha lf ofthe generalpublic,
an unfair competition action against a retailer who, in violation of Penal Code
section 308, sells cigarettes to minors. Such actions are permitted under the
Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17209.
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc .............. 509
X.I1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In the context of workers' compensation, an employer's insurer is subrogated
to the employer's contractual rights and duties when the insurer stands in the
employer's shoes in litigation; thus where an insurer initiates litigation against
a third party, the third party has a right to recover attorney fees from the
insurer based on the terms of the contract executed by the employer and the
third party.
Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin. 514
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I. Appellate Review
The accelerated time frame of thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal to
a final judgement in a cause of action involving the validity of agreements
entered into by public bodies also applies to appealable orders entered in those
validation actions.
Planning and Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources, Supreme
Court of California, Decided January 22, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 264, 949 P.2d 488, 70
Cal. Rptr. 2d 635.
Facts. California Code of Civil Procedure section 870 provides for an accelerated
process for determining the validity of contractual agreements entered into by
public agencies. One of the requirements of the accelerated proceedings is a thirty
day time period for filing a notice of appeal from final judgement. California Rules
of Court normally allow the earlier of either sixty days after notice of entry of a
final judgement or 180 days after entry of the final judgement.
The petitioners in the case at hand, the Planning and Conservation League,
sued the California Department of Water Resources seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the enforcement of the 1994 Monterrey Agreement. The
agreement outlined the allocation of water to local water agencies. The Planning
and Conservation League alleged violations of the California Environmental
Quality Act and the non-alienation mandate of Water Code section 11464.
Pursuant to this action, the League issued summons to twenty-eight state water
contractors who had participated in the Monterrey Agreement. Several of the state
agencies moved to quash service of summons and for summary adjudication. The
superior court granted summary adjudication on June 10, 1996 and granted the
motion to quash service of summons on June 18, 1996. Notice of entry-of the order
quashing service was served on June 24, 1998. On August 10 the superior court
resolved all causes of action and entered a final judgement in favor of the
Department of Water Resources, and notice of this entry was served on August 19,
1996. The next day, the League filed an appeal from the order quashing service of
summons. The court of appeal granted the motion, dismissing the appeal on the
grounds that it was untimely filed, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
section 870. The court of appeal measured the time period for filing a notice of
appeal from the order quashing service of summons on June 24, which was beyond
the thirty day time limit.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the order quashing service of summons was a final judgement and
that an appeal filed more than thirty days from the receipt of notice of that order was
untimely, and therefore precluded by law.
The court noted that final judgements and appealable orders are distinct
creatures. Although appealable orders, such as an order quashing service of
438
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summons, are described as "judgements" in the California Rules of Civil Procedure
section 904.1, this broad definition only specifically applies to normal appellate
procedure and not to the specific appellate procedure delineated in this statute.
Many statutes regarding appeals treat appealable orders and final judgements
differently. The plain language of this statute is imprecise as to whether the
legislature intended to include appealable orders in the term "judgement." The court
noted that the legislative history behind section 870 was to limit the time for appeal
in order to reduce the period of uncertainty before the finality of a validation action.
The court determined that the legislative purpose behind, the rule for accelerated
appellate procedure would be frustrated if different time frames were permitted for
appealable orders and final judgements. Additionally, because the plaintiffs in this
case did file a timely appeal from the final judgement entered on August 19, 1996,
the plaintiffs were not precluded from a remedy at law and as such, public policy
considerations were not sufficient to reverse the decision of the lower court.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 860 (West 1998) (stating that the nature of a validation
proceeding for a public agency shall be in rem).
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 870 (West 1998) ("[N]o appeal shall be allowed from any
judgement pursuant to this chapter unless a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days
after the notice of entry of the judgement .... ).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1998) (stating that an order to quash service
of summons is an appealable order).
CAL. R. OF CT. 2 (West 1998) (setting the normal time frame for filing a notice of
appeal as sixty days from a judgement in all cases not governed by California Civil
Procedure Code section 870 or other statute).
Case Law:
League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 105 Cal. App. 3d 394,
164 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1980) (holding that where no appeal had been taken to an order
granting a motion to quash service of summons and the time for appeal had passed,
the court of appeal did not have jurisdiction to review the order).
Friedland v. City of Long Beach, 62 Cal. App. 4th 835, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (1998)
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(stating that the validation action enacted by the legislature serves to quickly affirm
the legality of a public agency's transactions, thereby facilitating the operation of the
public agency).
Gould, Inc. v. Health Sciences, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 687, 126 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1976)
(holding that an order granting a motion to quash service of summons was a final
judgement and therefore appealable).
Legal Texts:
4 CAL. JuR. 3DAppellate Review § 20 (1998) (discussing the manner of computation
of time for filing of an appeal).
4 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review §§ 17-18 (1998) (generally discussing time
limitations for filing an appeal and options for extending or shortening that time).
4 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 58 (1998) (describing appeals from an order
granting a motion to quash service or summons)..
9 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 3 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing the
statutory sources of appellate jurisdiction).
9 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 126 (4th ed. 1997) (listing
appealable and non-appealable orders).
9 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 473 (4th ed. 1997) (describing
the different time periods for filing an appeal, including the thirty day time period
after entry of or notice of entry of judgement in a validation proceeding by a public
agency).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Dorothy Toth Beasley et al., Time on Appeal in State Intermediate Appellate Courts,
37 No. 3 JUDGES' J. 12 (1998) (discussing the importance of timeliness in the
performance of state appellate courts).
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Jeffrey Dehner, Note, Due Process Requires Notice of Entry of Final Judgements
in Ohio: Moldovan v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Department and Atkinson v.
Grumman Ohio Corp., 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043 (1990) (describing the changes in




A. California Civil Code section 52.1, which authorizes suit against anyone for
threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes with the exercise or enjoyment
of rights under federal or state law, regardless of whether the offender acted
under color of law, requires an attempted or completed act of interference with
the legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion; however, this section does not
apply to a private actor's putative violations of legal guaranties that only limit the
state's power.
Jones v. K-Mart Corp., Supreme Court of California, Decided January 29, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 329, 949 P.2d 941, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844.
Facts. California Civil Code section 52.1 authorizes an action for damages and
attorney's fees against anyone who, "whether or not acting under color of law,"
interferes with an individual's constitutional rights. This code section was enacted
primarily as a deterrent to hate crimes.
On the morning of May 26, 1991, sixteen-year-old Belafanti Jones visited a K-
mart store in San Leandro, California with his mother, Floyzell, his two sisters, his
brother, and other family members. Jones intended to purchase some dye to color
a pair of pants. He selected a box of dye from K-Mart's shelves, picked it up, and
then proceeded to the electronics department to browse while he waited for his
mother to finish her shopping. Though he looked at various items, and handled a
calculator and cassette tapes, he did not leave the electronics department with
anything except the box of dye. Brian Schmidt, a K-Mart security employee,
became suspicious when he saw Jones, an African-American, walking up and down
the aisles. Schmidt watched Jones, believing he was a potential shoplifter.
As Jones was walking through the store, one of his cousins told him that his
mother was looking for him. Jones went to the women's clothing department in
search of his mother. Jones was unable to locate his mother, so he proceeded to the
front of the store, thinking that his mother might be in line at the cash register. Near
the cash register, Jones encountered his sister Lashall, who told him that their
mother was waiting for him outside in their van. Jones put down the box of dye next
to one of the cash registers, walked in front of the registers, and exited the store
through the front door.
Schmidt did not see Jones put down the box of dye because cash registers and
other customers blocked Schmidt's view. Schmidt also did not make any attempt
to check to see if Jones had put down the box before exiting the store. Instead,
Schmidt called a "code blue," which is K-Mart terminology for an emergency
situation requiring back-up assistance. Schmidt and K-Mart's loss prevention
manager, McGuinness, ran after Jones and yelled at him, "hey, excuse me." Jones
turned around, saw the two men (who were wearing jeans and regular shirts), and
continued walking. Schmidt and McGuinness repeated, "hey, excuse me." Jones
442
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stopped and turned a second time and again continued on his way. Schmidt and
McGuinness caught up with Jones as he neared the van where his mother was
waiting for him. They grabbed Jones by the arms and asked what he had done with
the items he had in the store. Jones explained to Schmidt and McGuinness that he
had left the box of dye in the front of the store near a cash register.
At this time, Jones' mother got out of the van and asked what was going on.
McGuinness told her they suspected Jones of shoplifting and were going to conduct
a search of his person. Mrs. Jones asked her son if he had stolen anything; Jones
replied that he had not. Mrs. Jones objected to any search and told McGuinness to
call the police. McGuinness refused to call the police and asked Jones what was in
his left-front pants pocket. Jones replied that it was one of his cassette tapes. Jones
then started to remove the cassette tape from his pocket. Mrs. Jones told Jones to
put it back and he did. Mrs. Jones again asked McGuinness to contact the police.
McGuinness refused to do so for a second time. Mrs. Jones asked her daughter
Lashall to telephone the police. McGuinness then conducted a patdown of Jones'
pocket. Without Jones' permission and over Mrs. Jones' protestations, McGuinness
took the cassette tape.
McGuinness then stated that he needed to handcuff Jones. Mrs. Jones repeated
her request that the police be called. McGuinness refused for a third time. He
grabbed Jones' left arm to handcuff him, Jones resisted, and a struggle ensued. By
this time, four or five K-Mart employees were at the scene and assisted in subduing
the sixteen-year-old Jones. In the process, Jones' shirt was torn off, he was thrown
against the van and a parked car, punched in the face and neck, and placed in a
choke hold. As a result of the assault by the K-Mart employees, Jones suffered
painful back, neck, and shoulder injuries.
One of the K-Mart employees took Jones' cassette tape into the store, learned
that it was not K-Mart property, and reported back this information to McGuinness,
who released Jones. When a San Leandro police officer arrived on the scene,
McGuinness told the officer that there had been a misunderstanding about a theft of
a cassette tape. Because Jones did not shoplift anything, K-Mart was unable to bring
any charges against him.
Jones brought suit against the individual K-Mart employees who mistreated him
and against K-Mart Corporation (collectively K-Mart) on a theory of respondeat
superior. The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for Jones on his
claims of false imprisonment, battery, interference with his constitutional rights "by
using excessive force against him [and] by the illegal search of his person," and
negligence. The jury found, however, that Jones was unable to prove his claim that
K-Mart discriminated against him and subjected him to violence because of his race.
Under the heading of compensatory damages, the jury awarded Jones $1,394.25 in
economic damages and $40,000.00 in non-economic damages. The jury further
awarded Jones $30,000 for interference with his constitutional rights in violation of
443
the Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1. The jury awarded attorney's fees
for the section 52.1 claim in the amount of $188,724 for fees plus $28,038.50 for
the cost of the fees application for a total of $216,762.50.
K-Mart appealed the jury verdict and the California Court of Appeal reversed
as to the $30,000 award for the Bane Act claim and the $216,762.50 for attorney's
fees for the same claim. The court of appeal affirmed as to all other claims brought
by Jones.
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a private
actor can be sued under the Bane Act for interfering with a plaintiff's constitutional
guaranties that limit state power.
Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal's
ruling, which overturned Jones' award for his claim brought pursuant to the Bane
Act. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal's determination that the trial
court had erred in instructing the jury that Jones could recover for violation of his
state and federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
based on the facts of this case. The court stated that it is well-established that the
state and federal constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and seizure
applies only to the acts of government officers or their agents. Because the K-Mart
loss-prevention personnel were not acting in concert with any officers or agents of
the government when they attacked Jones, their conduct did not constitute state
action.
The court further held that the legislature did not do away with the state actor
requirement by providing that liability may be imposed under the Bane Act whether
or not the defendant is acting under color of law. The court reasoned that the "color
of law" requirement is a statutory rather than constitutionally mandated requisite to
specific civil rights actions. As such, by dispensing with the "color of law"
requirement, the legislature did not alter the nature of the rights provided under the
state and federal constitutions. Because there was no state action involved, the court
held that K-Mart was incapable of violating Jones' right against unreasonable search
and seizure under the state and federal constitutions. Thus, no action for any such
violation could lie.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures).
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures).
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (West Supp. 1999) (right to bring suit against anyone for
threats, intimidation, or coercion interfering with the exercise or enjoyment of rights
under federal or state law, regardless of whether the offender acted under color of
law).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.9 (West 1988) (violation of restraining order or injunction
issued by a court pursuant to the Bane Act is a crime).
Case Law:
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (state action
required for Fourth Amendment violation).
Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (city council members' votes
denying salary increases to city auditor were insufficiently threatening to state claim
under the Bane Act).
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d 834 (1994) (state action required for violation of CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13).
Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. App. 4th 141,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
887 (1995) (Bane Act was not wrongful death provision and, thus, parents of black
man who was shot and killed by a white police officer had no standing under the Act
to seek damages for interference with their constitutional right to parent).
Legal Texts:
15 AM. JuR. 2D Civil Rights § 261 (1976 & Supp. 1997) (discussing civil remedies,
actions, and proceedings for civil rights claims under state law).
68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 227 (1993) (discussing that although
constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures only apply to
state actors, an illegal search by a private individual may be a trespass or a violation
of one's right to privacy actionable in tort).
12 CAL. JUR. 3D Civil Rights § 11 (1974 & Supp. 1998) (discussing remedies for
civil rights violations under California law).
20 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2512 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the legality
of searches by private individuals).
8 B.E. WriTN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 775 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the Bane Act).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Lisa S.L. Ho, Comment, Substantive Penal Hate Crime Legislation: Toward
Defining Constitutional Guidelines Following The R.A. V. v. City Of St. Paul And
Wisconsin v. Mitchell Decisions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 711 (1994) (discussing
how legislative attempts to quell hate crimes by enacting substantive penal hate
crime legislation have met resistance in federal and state courts).
Brian L. Williams, Note, Criminal Constitutional Law-An Attack On Fourth
Amendment Protection: Security Guards And The "Private" Search Doctrine-State
v. Buswell, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 175 (1991) (discussing a Minnesota case
wherein the court held that action by a security guard did not constitute state action
so as to invoke the Fourth Amendment).
Peter J. Gardner, Comment, Arrest and Search Powers Of Special Police In
Pennsylvania: Do Your Constitutional Rights Change Depending On the Officer's
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B. A California district attorney acts on behalf of the state when prosecuting and
preparing to prosecute criminal violations of state law, as well as when
establishing policy and training employees in these areas, and hence a county is
not subject to § 1983 liability for the prosecutor's actions in that regard.
Pitts v. County of Kern, Supreme Court of California, Decided January 29, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 340, 949 P.2d 920, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431.
Facts. Within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government, such as a
county, is legally a "person." However, neither a state nor a state official, when
sued in its official capacity, constitutes a "person" within the understood meaning
of § 1983. Thus, while a state will be immunized from liability in a § 1983 suit for
civil liability, a county will not.
In 1985, the plaintiffs were convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse of
young children. After serving several years in state prison, the convictions were
overturned on appeal in 1990 due to prosecutorial misconduct and errors on the part
of the trial judge. In 1991, the district attorney dismissed the case against the
plaintiffs, and by 1994, all of the original children who had testified at the trial had
recanted their testimony and claimed that they had been forced to testify falsely.
After the dismissal, the plaintiffs filed suit against Kern County, the sheriff, the
district attorney, and various members of the district attorney's office. The
complaint alleged that several deputy district attorneys, as well as an investigator
with the district attorney's office, coerced false testimony from the children and
failed to reveal exculpatory evidence. The district attorney, who was not personally
involved with the case, was alleged to have fostered a policy condoning this type of
prosecutorial misconduct.
The trial judge entered summary judgment for the county, holding that the
county was absolutely immune from liability for any act for which the district
attorney had immunity, and that the county could neither hire, fire, nor discipline the
district attorney, an elected public official. The trial court also entered summary
judgment for the district attorney.
The court of appeal affirmed the entry of summaryjudgment against the district
attorney, but reversed the summary judgment holding as to the county. The court
justified its reversal by stating that a California district attorney has attributes of
both a state and local officer. It further held that as a matter of law, the district
attorney is not a county policymaker for § 1983 purposes. The California Supreme
Court granted review to consider the following: 1) whether a California district
attorney acts on behalf of the state or the county when preparing to prosecute and
while prosecuting criminal violations of state law; and 2) whether a California
district attorney acts on behalf of the state or the county when establishing policy
and training employees in these areas.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that a California district attorney acts on behalf of the state when
preparing to prosecute and while prosecuting criminal violations of state law.
Further, it held that a district attorney also acts on behalf of the state when training
personnel and developing policy regarding the preparation for prosecution and
prosecution of criminal violations of state law. Such a decision effectively
immunized all counties in California from § 1983 liability with respect to the actions
of a district attorney.
The court first reviewed case law of several supreme court cases that established
that local governments "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
or injunctive relief' and that neither states nor state officials acting in their official
capacities are "person[s]" within the meaning of § 1983 when sued for damages.
Further, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on a theory of
respondeat superior. The municipality is responsible only when its policy or custom
inflicts the injury, and the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury
alleged.
After reviewing the policy rationale for prosecutorial immunity, the court then
discussed the two issues presented: whether California district attorneys act for the
state or the county in conducting a prosecution, and whether they act for the state or
county when they establish policy and train and supervise staff.
With regard to the first issue of prosecuting and preparing to prosecute criminal
violations, the court examined the functions of a district attorney by reviewing
article V of the California Constitution and section 25303 of the Government Code.
In contrasting the extent to which both the state attorney general and the county
board of supervisors exercise control over a district attorney, the court concluded
that these provisions weighed heavily in favor of concluding that a district attorney
is a state official in this capacity. The court observed, incidentally, that both the
plaintiffs and the county were in agreement on this issue.
The second issue, training and supervising staff, was then resolved quickly by
the court. The court held that it logically follows that if the district attorney
represents the state in prosecutorial activities, then he or she likewise represents the
state when training and developing policy in these areas. "No meaningful analytical
distinction can be made between these two functions," the court reasoned. Such
may not be the case, the court reasoned, if the plaintiffs were challenging a district
attorney's action related to hiring or firing an employee, workplace safety
conditions, procuring office equipment, or some other administrative function
arguably unrelated to the prosecution of state criminal law violations.
Every California district attorney, for purposes of § 1983 liability, therefore acts
on behalf of the state when training personnel for and when developing policy
regarding the preparation for prosecution and prosecution of criminal violations of
state law. As such, counties are immune from § 1983 liability resulting from actions
taken by the district attorney. The court declined to address the issue of whether the
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immunity afforded the district attorney under § 1983 derivatively immunizes the
county in which he or she holds office.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (defining the basis for compensation and means of
deterrence for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color
of state law).
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13 (West 1998) (defining the powers and duties of the
attorney general of the state).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. x, § 12524 (1998) (authorizing the attorney general to
"conference" with the district attorneys to discuss their duties "with the view of the
uniform and adequate enforcement" of state law).
Case Law:
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (defining the scope of § 1983 law, and
reviving a long-dormant Reconstruction-era civil rights statute).
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (neither states nor state
officials acting in their official capacities are "person[s]" within the meaning of §
1983).
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local
governments can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief).
McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (resolving the question of which
entity a government official represents when performing a certain function).
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ("personal-capacity suits seek to impose




4 B.E. WITKiN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction to
Criminal Procedure § 1789 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the duties, powers and
restrictions of district attorneys).
4 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction to
Criminal Procedure § 1786 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing principal powers and duties
of the attorney general with regard to criminal matters).
20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2292 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
the concept of criminal immunity).
19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2032 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
jurisdiction of the attorney general).
20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2296-2297 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (analyzing the
scope of immunity in felony prosecutions).
Law Review and Journal Articles
Matthew W. Bennett, McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 27 STETSON L. REV.
950 (1998) (analyzing the constitutional import of the McMillian case and its impact
on governmental liability).
Mary Massaron Ross et al., Recent Developments in Governmental Liability, 33
TORT & INS. L.J. 469 (1998) (examining the recent developments in the area of
constitutional law and civil rights as they affect governmental liability).
Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BULLETIN, California:
District Attorney is State Official for Purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1998).
DEREK BROWN
450
[Vol. 26: 433, 1999] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
III. COSTS
A. "Reasonable attorney fees and costs" may be awarded to the successful party
in a Fair Employment and Housing Act case pursuant to Government Code
section 12965 (b) to the exclusion of fees of an expert not ordered by the court
unless there is express law authorizing the award of such fees.
Davis v. KGO-T. V., Inc., Supreme Court of California, Decided February 5, 1998,
17 Cal. 4th 436, 950 P.2d 567, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452.
Facts. California Government Code section 12965(b) invests in the trial court the
right to award "reasonable attorney fees and costs" to the winning party. This
discretionary provision is limited by California Code of Civil Procedure section
1033.5, which states that the fees of an expert that is not ordered by the court to
testify at the proceedings are not recoverable unless expressly called for by law. The
plaintiff, Steve Davis, was let go from his position as a reporter with the defendant,
KGO-T.V., Inc. The plaintiff was fifty-three years old at the commencement of this
action and had worked for KGO-T.V., Inc. for twenty years. He alleged wrongful
termination on the basis of age, which is a Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) violation. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him damages. The
trial court entered judgment as such and further awarded him costs and attorney fees.
The costs awarded to the plaintiff included, in their total, an amount for expert
witnesses not called for by the court. Both parties appealed different aspects of the
trial court's decision, and the court of appeal affirmed the lower court's decision in
all respects except for one. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred
when awarding, as costs, the fees of experts not ordered by the courts. The court of
appeal reversed the award and remanded the issue to the trial court for a recalcula-
tion of costs compatible with its decision. The California Supreme Court granted
review to consider whether fees of an expert not ordered by the court may be
recovered by the victorious party.
Holding. Reversing the'decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the fees of experts not ordered by the court are not an acceptable
item to be figured into the costs in an action brought under FEHA. Under common
law rule, parties involved in litigation must pay for their costs sustained during
proceedings. The right to recover such costs is a statutorily created right. California
Government Code section 12965(b) is the statute at issue, and declares that in a
FEHA action, "the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party
reasonable attorney fees and costs ..... " Though this statute creates such a right, it
does not define exactly what is included in "costs." The plaintiff argued that "costs"
includes any and all items of cost, limited only by the trial court. Prior to a
subsequently codified definition of "costs," the term was held to incorporate any
fees or charges required by law to be paid to the courts or amounts specifically
slated as recoverable. The fees of experts not ordered by the court were considered
non-allowable items of cost, justified by the reasoning that "where, as here, an
[expert] is not appointed by the court but is employed by one of the parties, the
temptation to act in the interest of such party must be apparent and the court should
not require the opposite party to pay for the services thus rendered."
The legislature finally defined the term "costs" in California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033.5 by specifying which costs are allowable and which costs
are not allowable. Therefore, before and after California Government Code section
12965 (b) was enacted into law, the fees of experts not ordered by the court were not
an allowable cost.
The supreme court did note that there are exceptions to the general rule that
expert fees not ordered by the court are a cost not allowed, but stated that the
legislature could have created an exception for a FEHA action but did not. Those
exceptions are limited to certain situations, and the issue involved here is not one of
them. Similarly, federal law does not allow expert fees not ordered by the court to
be recoverable by the triumphant party. At the federal level, as at the state level, the
authorization for expert fees must be expressly stated.
The plaintiff argued that California Government Code section 12965 (b) and
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 are in conflict. As previously
stated, both before and after California Government Code section 12965(b) was
enacted, the winning party had no right to recover costs of fees for experts not
ordered by the court. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 only
codified the already existing law.
The plaintiff also contended that the definition of "costs" renders meaningless
the portion of the California Government Code section 12965 stating that the court
has its discretion to award attorney fees. This contention is also unwarranted
because the trial court has discretion to determine if allowable costs are even
necessary, and if necessary, if the costs are reasonable in amount, and can deny or
award other allowable costs not mentioned in the California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1033.5. The plaintiff argued that at the time of enactment of California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, there was no decisional law regarding this issue.
The court was convinced that the legislative intent was only to codify existing law
and not to establish new case law on this issue.
The last argument that the plaintiff put forth was a policy argument urging fees
for experts to be allowable in order to "make whole" the injured plaintiff, and to
provide a financial incentive to bring similar suits forth. The court was only
concerned with statutory construction and did not deal with this policy argument,
except to reiterate that the traditional common law rule is for each party to bear its
own costs, and to state how unpersuaded the court was that an incentive was needed
to bring forth like cases. Therefore, fees of experts not ordered by the court were
determined to be non-allowable items of costs in FEHA actions.
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B. A party in whose favor a voluntary dismissal has been given may recover
attorney fees in accordance with a contract provision awarding attorney fees as
long as the original claim was that of tort, not contract.
Santisas v. Goodin, Supreme Court of California, Decided February 26, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 599, 951 P.2d 399, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830.
Facts. The plaintiffs, Benjamin and Anita Santisas, brought an action against
Robert and Phyllis Goodin, Goodin Realty Company, and Daniel Guthrie, an
attorney for Goodin Realty, for alleged defects in a home bought by the plaintiffs
from Robert Goodin acting as an agent for Goodin Realty. The complaint alleged
negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, deceit, and suppression
of fact. The complaint also contained an attachment called "Residential purchase
Agreement and deposit Receipt." One paragraph of the purchase agreement
described that if any legal action was taken as a result of the agreement, the
prevailing party would be entitled to receive from the other party reasonable attorney
fees to be determined by the court. After discovery, the plaintiffs dismissed the
action with prejudice.
The defendants then moved to obtain reasonable attorney fees under the
provision of the purchase agreement. The plaintiffs submitted a brief in opposition
of the motion. The motion argued that California Civil Code section 1717 and the
California Supreme Court's decision in International Industries, Inc. v. Open, 21
Cal. 3d 218, 577 P.2d 1031, 145 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1978), prohibit an award of
attorney fees. The superior court granted the defendants' motion and awarded
attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, holding "that a party who successfully
defends a tort action arising from a contract that entitles the winner in any litigation
to an award of attorney fees is the 'prevailing party' and may recover such fees as
an element of costs, even where the plaintiff dismisses the suit voluntarily."
Holding. The California Supreme Court held that contractual attorney fees
provisions are enforceable unless barred by California Civil Code section 1717. In
the present case, the defendants could recover for the defense of the tort actions, but
not for the breach of contract claim. The court noted that although section 1717
prohibits the recovery of attorney fees if the action is voluntarily dismissed, section
1717 "applies only to causes of action that are based on the contract and therefore
within the scope of section 1717."
The court further held that its decision in Open did not prohibit the recovery of
attorney fees in this case. In Open, the court concluded that a defendant in whose
favor a dismissal has been awarded in contract claims is not a prevailing party
because it is not technically a final judgment. After Open, the state legislature
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amended section 1717 to bar recovery of attorney fees in contract claims where there
is a voluntary dismissal. However, the state legislature did not extend section 1717
to cover tort actions. Therefore, the voluntary dismissal of tort causes of action will
not bar recovery of attorney fees.
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A. Evidence of two separate enumerated criminal acts on the same occasion, one
committed by the defendant and the other by a member of the defendant's gang,
are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of California Penal Code
section 186.22. Thus, crimes committed by two or more persons on the same
occasion are sufficient to establish a "pattern of criminal gang activity."
People v. Louen, Supreme Court of Califomia, Decided December 22, 1997, 17 Cal.
4th 1, 947 P.2d 1313, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776.
Facts. In 1988, the California Legislature enacted the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act, or the STEP Act, to eradicate the criminal activity of street
gangs. The 1997 amendment of this provision is found in sections 186.20 to 186.27
of the California Penal Code. In order to fall within the definition of a "criminal
street gang" under former subsection (f) of section 186.22, three requirements must
be met: (1) the group must consist of at least three people and have a group name or
sign; (2) a primary activity of the group must be to commit one of the offenses
enumerated in the STEP Act; and (3) "the group's members must engage in or have
engaged in a "pattern of criminal gang activity." According to section 186.22, a
"pattern of gang activity" exists when statutorily enumerated offenses are
"committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons."
On May 27, 1993, Ariel Ramirez was working at a gas station; Ramirez had a
red shop rag hanging out of his pocket. Three Cambodians, including the defendant
Chanda John Louen, entered the gas station, each with a blue bandana in his back
pocket, signifying the gang "Crip." Upon seeing Ramirez's red cloth, the Cambo-
dians took Ramirez to be a "Blood," the "Crip's" rival gang. Later that day,
Ramirez's cousin, Jose Ivan Corral, came to the gas station and Ramirez told Corral
of his encounter with the Cambodians. Corral went to check out the situation, only
to find himself being chased by 40-50 Asians, the defendant being one of them.
Corral tripped and fell to the ground. The defendant hit Corral on the head,
shoulder, and arm with a baseball bat. On that same occasion, Chad Hen, a member
of the defendant's group, struck Corral in the ribs with a tire iron.
The prosecution presented evidence of both attacks in order to establish a
"pattern of gang activity" necessary to apply section 186.22 of the California Penal
Code. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in prison: three years
for assault with a deadly weapon, three years for inflicting great bodily injury, and
two years for the "street gang" enhancement. The two years for "street gang"
membership was added because it appeared that the crime committed by the
defendant benefitted a criminal street gang.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the assault charge against him, coupled
with the assault by Hen, was not sufficient to establish a "pattern of gang activity,"
thereby reducing the defendants sentence by two years. The defendant argued that
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the prosecution had to "present evidence of at least one other prior offense of gang
activity" in order to meet the statutory requirement necessary to establish a "pattern
of gang activity." The court of appeal disagreed with the defendant and affirmed
the trial court's decision. The defendant then filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court of California. The supreme court granted review to determine if
evidence of the crime with which the defendant was charged, coupled with evidence
of a crime committed by a member of the defendant's gang on that same occasion,
establishes a "pattern of criminal gang activity."
Holding. The California Supreme Court, upholding both the trial court and court
of appeal decisions, held that the prosecution's use of the defendant's assault on
Corral, along with Hen's assault of Corral on the same occasion, constituted the
requisite "pattern of criminal activity" necessary to link the defendant to a "criminal
street gang." Therefore, the defendant was subject to the two-year "street gang"
enhancement on his sentence.
On review, the defendant argued that the defendant must have committed aprior
offense, or have known of prior offenses committed by the group, in order to
establish a "pattern of criminal gang activity." The defendant further argued that an
offense predating the current charge was "compelled by constitutional principles of
freedom of association and due process." The supreme court disagreed, stating that
a prior criminal charge was not a prerequisite to finding a "pattern of gang activity,"
nor was not having a prior charge a violation of due process.
The defendant further argued that the court's construction of the STEP Act
violated ex post facto principles because the interpretation of a "pattern of criminal
gang activity" was changed by the 1997 amendment of section 186.22 and the
defendant was originally sentenced under the 1988 version of section 186.22. The
supreme court disagreed, stating that there was "no uniform appellate rule" that
interpreted the statute in a manner contrary to this court's interpretation. Therefore,
it did not matter that the defendant was initially charged under the 1988 version of
the STEP Act.
Finally, the defendant contended that the legislature intended to increase the
prosecution's burden of establishing a "pattern of criminal gang activity" because
the legislature changed the language of section 186.22 subdivision (e) from "the
offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons" to "the
offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons." The
defendant argued that by changing the word "are" to "were," the legislature intended
that the defendant commit "two or more"offenses before a "pattern of criminal gang
activity" could be established. The supreme court disagreed, stating that the change
in verb tense in section 186.22 (e) did not indicate an intent by the legislature to
increase the prosecutorial burden of establishing a "pattern of criminal gang
behavior." Accordingly, the supreme court held that separate enumerated criminal
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acts by the defendant and a member of the defendant's group on the same occasion
established the requisite "pattern of criminal gang activity" necessary to sentence the
defendant under the STEP Act.
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B. A trial court's discretion to vacate a prior felony conviction "in furtherance
ofjustice," pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 (a), is subject to review for abuse
of discretion, and the court must set forth its reasons for the dismissal in an order
entered in the minutes; if the decision to vacate is based on a guilty plea and
reversed on appeal, the defendant may return to the status quo at remand by
withdrawing his plea.
People v. Williams, Supreme Court of California, Decided January 5, 1998 (Modified
February 25, 1998), 17 Cal. 4th 148, 948 P.2d 429, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917.
Facts. Penal Code section 1395 (a) permits a trial court to dismiss an action "in
furtherance of justice," requiring that the reasons for the dismissal be entered into
the minutes. In People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628,
53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996), the state supreme court ruled that the dismissal power
included the power to vacate allegations of prior felony convictions that are
significant in sentencing. Penal Code section 667, the legislative version of the
Three Strikes law, mandates a minimum twenty-five year sentence for a conviction
for a felony if there are at least two prior felony convictions. In 1995, the defendant,
Reginald Williams, was arrested for driving under the influence, which may be
charged alternatively as a misdemeanor or as a felony pursuant to Vehicle Code
section 23160. At the information, the district attorney alleged that the defendant
had been convicted for the same offense three times over the course of seven years.
The district attorney also alleged two previous felony convictions, bringing the case
under the Three Strikes law. At the subsequent jury trial, the prosecution recited an
extensive list of the defendant's criminal background, including parole violations
and spousal abuse.
The trial court found no mitigating factors supporting the defendant's motion
to declare his offense a misdemeanor, but did state that the Three Strikes law would
not apply if it vacated a prior felony conviction, which it deemed appropriate in the
case. The defendant responded by offering a guilty plea, which the court accepted.
On its own motion, the court found authority to strike a prior conviction under Penal
Code section 1385(a), basing its decision on the seemingly non-violent nature of the
defendant's crimes and imposing a sentence of nine years in prison. The court of
appeal reversed, finding no mitigating circumstances in the record that could justify
the order vacating a prior felony conviction. Instead of remanding to the trial court
to determine the appropriate sentence, the court of appeal imposed a twenty-eight
year sentence under the Three Strikes law. The California Supreme Court granted
review to clarify the requirements of its ruling in Romero.
Holding. Affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeal,
the supreme court held that under Penal Code section 1385(a), a decision to vacate
a prior conviction must be accompanied by the reasoning behind that decision
entered on the minutes. Recalling Romero, the court reiterated that the trial court's
decision was subject to review for abuse of discretion. If the reason for dismissal
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was solely for judicial efficiency or in objection to the Three Strikes law, that
dismissal should be reversed.
The test under Romero balances the defendant's rights against disproportionate
punishment with society's interest in the prosecution of crimes. Factors relevant
under the test include the circumstances surrounding the defendant's instant felony
conviction, prior felony and other criminal convictions, the violent nature of those
crimes, and the defendant's personal character. The absence of a serious criminal
background may suggest that the Three Strikes law should not be applied.
However, the court found few mitigating factors supporting the trial court's
decision to strike one of the defendant's prior convictions. His frequent parole
violations, convictions for various criminal activities, and time incarcerated, as well
as his conviction for spousal abuse, suggested that the trial court's conclusion that
his character had improved and that his crimes were non-violent was clearly
erroneous. Because the dismissal was unsound, the supreme court vacated the
judgment and upheld that part of the court of appeal's decision.
On the other hand, the supreme court reversed the sentence imposed by the
court of appeal. As the trial court gave no reason for its decision, that exercise of
discretion was inherently ineffective. If a decision central to the judgment is
ineffective, then that judgment itself is ineffective, and the appropriate remedy is to
return the defendant to the status quo before he entered his plea upon the court's
inducement. The trial court could reach a different ruling on remand, but it was not
obligated to do so.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999) (imposing, by legislative enactment, a
minimum twenty-five year prison sentence in a felony conviction on the finding of
two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1999) (imposing a similar minimum sentence
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magistrate to dismiss an action"in furtherance of justice").
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CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160 (West Supp. 1999) (alternatively classifying the offense
of driving under the influence as a misdemeanor or a-felony based upon the number
of prior convictions for the same offense).
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C. A criminal defendant offered no evidence that his alleged mental disability
rendered him unable to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights;
thus, the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence pretrial statements the
defendant made to the police after he waived his Miranda rights. Furthermore,
the trial court's admission of the defendant's poor driving record into evidence
was harmless error because the defendant's own statements to the police
eliminated any reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been
different had the evidence of the defendant's poor driving record been excluded.
People v. Whitson, Supreme Court of California, Decided January 15, 1998, 17 Cal.
4th 229, 949 P.2d 18, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321.
Facts. On June 11, 1993, Costa Mesa Police Department Motorcycle Officer
Angelo Morgan observed a man, Derick Romo, running through a commercial
building complex parking lot. Upon seeing the officer, Romo headed toward a
Volkswagen Cabriolet (VW), and entered the vehicle. The defendant, Scott Alden
Whitson, was the driver of the vehicle and immediately sped away once Romo
entered the VW. Officer Morgan proceeded to follow the VW, which he estimated
to be traveling at approximately 80-85 miles per hour. After losing sight of the VW,
Officer Morgan sent a radio broadcast stating that he had discontinued his pursuit.
Shortly thereafter, a pedestrian signaled Officer Morgan to report a serious accident
at an intersection nearby. Upon arriving at the accident scene, Officer Morgan
observed the aftermath of a crash between the VW and an Acura sedan. An accident
reconstruction expert estimated that the VW struck the Acura at a ninety-degree
angle while traveling approximately seventy-seven miles per hour. Furthermore,
there was no evidence that either car attempted to brake, nor was there any evidence
of mechanical failure on the part of either vehicle. A pedestrian witness testified
that the VW had adequate time to avoid the collision and was approximately one-
half block from the intersection when his traffic signal turned red. Janice Diehm,
the driver of the Acura, and Romo, the defendant's passenger, both bled to death.
The defendant was charged with two counts of murder.
At trial, the prosecution offered evidence that six months prior to the accident,
the defendant had been interviewed in connection with an alleged shoplifting
incident where police advised him of his Miranda rights. At that time, the defendant
acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to continue the interview
with the police. The prosecution also called Christopher Andrews, the officer who
interviewed the defendant in the hospital emergency room approximately three hours
after the auto accident. Officer Andrews testified that he told the defendant "'you
understand you don't have to talk to me if you don't want to."' After acknowledg-
ing in a "'normal"' and "'clear"' voice that he understood his rights, according to
Officer Andrews, the defendant proceeded to tell Officer Andrews that, for
unknown reasons, he was being chased by a Hispanic male in a red Cadillac
immediately prior to the accident. After Officer Andrews expressed disbelief in the
defendant's story, the defendant admitted that Romo was planning on stealing a car
stereo at the time Officer Morgan spotted him in the parking lot. The defendant
admitted alluding the motorcycle that followed him from the parking lot, but denied
hearing the motorcycle's sirens or seeing its lights. He further stated that it was a
"'stupid' thing to try to steal the stereo" and that he believed he was traveling
approximately sixty miles per hour during the chase.
The second police interview took place at the hospital approximately 17 hours
later. Police Sergeant Larry Griswald, accompanied by Officer Andrews and
another deputy, readvised the defendant of his Miranda rights and asked the
defendant whether he understood them. According to Sergeant Griswald and
Officer Andrews, the defendant once again responded that he did understand his
rights and did not request an attorney, nor did he appear confused. During the
thirty-minute interview, the defendant repeated his earlier recollection of the events
and added that he was "'scared of the guy chasing me [on the motorcycle]."' He
also stated that immediately prior to the collision, he was afraid that the VW might
crash.
The police conducted a third interview of the defendant nine days after the
accident. Officer Andrews, Sergeant Griswald, and another deputy readvised the
defendant of his Miranda rights and once again asked him whether he understood
his rights. After the defendant responded in the affirmative, Officer Andrews asked
"'OK, and having your rights in mind do you want to answer a few questions for
me?"' Once again, the defendant responded affirmatively. During the interview,
when asked "'[d]id you realize that [traveling at such a high speed] was kind of
dangerous?,"' the defendant acknowledged "'[y]es, I did,"' but contended that he
continued to drive fast because his passenger, Romo, egged him on to do so.
Additionally, the defendant stated that he was "'afraid [he was] going to kill
someone or hurt someone else."' During this interview, the defendant also admitted
that no Cadillac had been chasing him prior to the accident.
The prosecution argued that it was entitled to introduce evidence related to the
defendant's driving record. Specifically, the prosecution wanted to admit evidence
that the defendant had attended traffic school three years prior to the accident, that
one month after attending traffic school, the defendant was involved in an accident
where police cited him for failing to yield the right of way, that one month after that
citation, the defendant received another citation for driving with excessive speed,
and finally that the defendant had also failed to obey a posted traffic sign one year
prior to the incident for which he was now charged. The prosecution argued that
this evidence tended to establish the defendant's "'subjective awareness of the rules
of the road and the dangers involved."'
In response to the prosecution's arguments regarding an implied waiver of
Miranda rights, the defense introduced testimony of the defendant's stepfather,
Ronald Wahl, who spoke with the defendant four hours after the accident, one hour
after Officer Andrews' initial interview with the defendant. Wahl testified that the
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defendant did not initially recognize him, that he drifted "'in and out,"' that his
answers to questions were not loud, clear, or responsive, and furthermore that "'you
could see he was in pain."'
The defense also introduced testimony from a clinical psychologist, Arnold
Purisch, who had interviewed the defendant twice approximately six months after
the accident. He characterized the defendant as "'anywhere between mentally
retarded to borderline intelligence."' Finally, the defense offered the testimony of
Gianna Scannell, a surgeon who examined the defendant shortly after the accident.
Dr. Scannell testified that, at that time, the defendant told her he did not remember
the accident.
The defendant sought to suppress his pretrial statement to the police, claiming
that he had not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived his Miranda
rights. He alleged that he was incapable of making an intelligent waiver due to his
injuries, and furthermore because he was "'functionally retarded."' The defendant
further sought to exclude evidence of his poor driving record, claiming that "such
evidence was irrelevant, and, if relevant, was unduly prejudicial."
The trial court found that the prosecution had presented uncontradicted
evidence that the police had advised the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to
conducting each of the three interviews. The court further noted that it did not find
an express waiver of Miranda rights necessary, but looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant was aware of his rights and responded to the
questioning without any evidence of coercion or duress. Additionally, the court
rejected the defendant's contention that his low intelligence, sufferance of pain from
the accident, and medicated state combined to establish that his waiver could not
have been knowing and intelligent. Rather, the evidence indicated that the defendant
was in control of his faculties and responsive to police questions. Finally, the court
found the defendant's poor driving history to be both relevant and not unduly
prejudicial. Upon hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding the
defendant guilty of two counts of second degree murder.
A divided court of appeal reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding that
the trial erred by admitting into evidence the defendant's pretrial statements. The
court held that the defendant did not waive his Miranda rights prior to his
conversations with the police. Additionally, the court held that the trial court erred
by admitting into evidence the defendant's poor driving record. The court reasoned
that a poor driving history, without a showing of similarity between the past and
present offenses, "'did not tend to prove the defendant knew his conduct endangered
life."'
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal
and held that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights
and therefore the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence the defendant's
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pretrial statements made during interviews with the police. Additionally, the court
held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's admitting into
evidence his poor driving record because there was no reasonable probability that
the jury would have reached a different result had the trial court excluded this
evidence.
Noting the lack of any suggestion that the police had resorted to physical or
psychological coercion to elicit statements from the defendant, the court focused
upon whether the defendant was mentally aware of his Miranda rights, and the
resulting consequences of a waiver of those rights. The court emphasized that the
prosecution must establish that a criminal defendant voluntarily waived his or her
Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, an appellate court
will accept the trial court's findings of facts, inferences, and credibility determina-
tions so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
Proceeding under these guidelines, the court concluded that the prosecution had
presented uncontroverted evidence that the defendant had knowingly and willfully
waived his Miranda rights during each of his three interviews with the police.
Although the defendant possessed relatively low intelligence, the court rejected his
contention that he lacked sufficient intelligence to understand the rights and
consequences of waiving his Miranda rights. The court noted that he was able to
pass a driver's test, to attempt to deceive police by claiming to have been chased by
a Cadillac, and to acknowledge the stupidity of Romo's plan to steal a car stereo.
Furthermore, the court considered the defendant's indication that he understood his
Miranda rights when he had waived those rights during the encounter with police
six months prior to the automobile accident. Considering all of these factors, the
court concluded that the evidence amply supported the trial court's finding that the
defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights.
Furthermore, the court also considered the trial court's admitting the defen-
dant's poor driving record into evidence as harmless error. Reversible error requires
that a reasonable probability must exist that the jury would have reached a different
result had the defendant's poor driving record been excluded. Because the
prosecution was offering it to support its claim that the defendant was subjectively
aware of the serious risks of his reckless driving, the defendant's statement that he
was afraid he was "going to kill someone or hurt someone else" independently
established this proposition and eliminated any reasonable probability that the jury's
verdict would have been different had the evidence of the defendant's poor driving
record been excluded. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeal's ruling
as to both issues.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled. in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ").
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U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (permitting federal courts to set aside judgments only
when an error "has resulted in a miscarriage of justice").
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 475 (West 1998) (permitting reversal of a lower court's
judgment only for prejudicial errors).
CAL. EvD. CODE § 210 (West 1998) (defining relevant evidence as "evidence,
including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant,
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.").
CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1998) (giving the court the discretion to "exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.").
Case Law:
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (noting that the prosecution must
prove the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights by a preponder-
ance of the evidence).
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979) (adopting a "totality of circum-
stances" approach for determining whether a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (affording defendants the right to remain
silent during police questioning to protect their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination).
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (concluding that a waiver of
Miranda rights may be "inferred by the actions and words of the person interro-
gated").
People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (1994) ("In
determining whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is relevant to demonstrate
a common design or plan... [t]he least degree of similarity (between the uncharged
act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.").
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People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990) (accepting
the trial court's findings of facts, inferences, and credibility determinations
regarding a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights, so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence).
People v. Nitschmann, 35 Cal. App. 4th 677,41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (1995) (upholding
a trial court's finding of implied waiver where the defendant failed to offer any
evidence that he was confused, misled, or reluctant to speak about an assault).
Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3165-3166 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
harmless error and its application to improperly admitted character evidence).
6 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Reversible
Error § 3276 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the requirement of
prejudice to the defendant for reversal of a judgment).
1 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIAEVIDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence § 322 (3d ed. 1986
& Supp. 1998) (discussing the inadmissibility of character evidence for purposes of
showing a defendant's propensity for engaging in careless conduct).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Daniel D. Blinka, Evidence of Character, Habit, and "Similar Acts" in Wisconsin
Civil Litigation, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 283 (1989) (addressing the admission of a
defendant's poor driving record as evidence that the a defendant acted in conformity
with that character trait on future occasions).
Paul T. Hourihan, Note, Earl Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation and the
Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471 (1995) (discussing the capability of
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D. A sentencing court has the discretion to strike prior felony convictions under
the "three strikes" law while in the presence of the defendant and his counsel.
People v. Rodriguez, Supreme Court of California, Decided January 15, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 253, 949 P.2d 31, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334.
Facts. The defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine base for sale.
Additionally, the trial court found that the defendant qualified for the "Three
Strikes" law. The trial judge stated that he was compelled to sentence the defendant
to twenty-five years to life as mandated by the "Three Strikes" law, as he lacked
discretion to strike prior felony convictions. However, People v. Superior Court
(Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996), a "fully
retroactive" decision, held that courts deciding Three Strikes cases do have
discretionary power to dismiss prior felony convictions.
The court of appeal purportedly affirmed the trial court's judgment but
remanded the case so that the trial court could decide whether or not to exercise its
discretion, as permitted by Romero. Additionally, the court of appeal held that if the
trial court decided not to exercise its discretion, the defendant need not be present
and the sentence remains the same. However, if the court decided to exercise its
discretion, then the defendant must be present and a new sentencing hearing must
be conducted. The defendant appealed the latter instruction, arguing that it violated
his constitutional right to be present at all crucial stages of trial.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant has the right to be present at the sentencing hearing
when the court is determining whether or not to exercise its discretion to strike a
prior felony conviction. Additionally, the court held that the trial judge mistakenly
believing that he lacked discretion to strike a prior felony conviction raised an issue
for appeal. Thus, the case must be remanded in order to make Romero fully
retroactive.
The court discussed the perplexing standard articulated by the court of appeal
that mandated that a defendant only be present if the court had already decided to
exercise its discretion. The court stated that the defendant needed to be present at
this "crucial stage" of trial in order to articulate arguments in favor of the court
exercising its discretion.
Finally, the court held that the defendant's prior felony conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon other than a firearm failed to constitute a "serious felony."
In order to qualify as a "serious felony" under that section, the defendant must
personally inflict great bodily injury or use a firearm. Neither the abstract of the
prior conviction judgment nor the prosecution proved that the defendant had in fact
personally inflicted great bodily injury or used a dangerous or deadly weapon. Thus,
this felony conviction cannot count as a strike against the defendant.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be
violated.").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West 1988) (articulating California's Three Strikes
Law).
Legal Texts:
22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3608 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
when people may appeal).
22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3617 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
when a defendant may appeal).
3 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment For
Crime § 1515 (B) (2d ed. Supp. 1997) (discussing various constitutional challenges
to Three Strikes Laws).
3 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment For
Crime § 1518 (2d ed. Supp. 1997) (discussing the impact of Romero).
Case Law:
People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497,917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
789 (1996) (granting trial judges discretion to strike prior felony conviction
allegations under the Three Strikes law).
People v. Fuhrman, 16 Cal. 4th 930, 941 P.2d 1189, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1997)
(withholding relief on appeal in "silent record" cases).
In re Cortez, 6 Cal. 3d 78, 490 P.2d 819, 98 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1971) (holding that a
defendant who had been sentenced under a statute that unconstitutionally restricted
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sentencing discretion was entitled to a new hearing before the sentencing court with
his counsel present).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Kerry L. Pyle, Note, Prison Employment: A Long-Term Solution to the Overcrowd-
ing Crisis, 77 B.U. L. REV. 151, 158 (1997) (discussing California's penal system
in the context of Three Strikes laws).
Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion:
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAULL. REv. 615,646-57 (1998)
(discussing California's Three Strikes law and the impact of Romero).
John Clark et al., Three Strikes and You're Out, 81 JUDICATURE 144 (1998)
(comparing California's Three Strikes laws to that of other states).
Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1967 (1998)
(stating that California's Three Strikes law is the toughest in the land).
California's "Three Strikes" Law: an Unconstitutional Infringement Upon the
Power of the Judiciary? 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 535 (1997) (discussing the judicial
impact of California's Three Strikes laws).
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E. Law enforcement personnel may temporarily seize a dwelling by restricting
access to it where there is reasonable suspicion that contraband or other evidence
is on the premises.
People v. Bennett, Supreme Court of California, Decided February 2, 1998, 17 Cal.
4th 373, 949 P.2d 947, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 850.
Facts. Edwin Winslow Bennett was arrested on September 27, 1989 for the murder
of James Busher. Later that day, a law enforcement officer telephoned the manager
of the motel where the defendant resided and asked her to deny entry to the room
without police authorization. The manager complied. A law enforcement officer
entered the room the next day, where he saw the rifle that was later revealed as the
murder weapon. A search warrant was eventually obtained for the room, but the
affidavit did not mention the initial search. Thereafter, the gun was seized.
At trial, the defendant's attorneys sought to exclude the rifle on the basis that
entry into the motel room was an illegal search. The rifle was admitted into
evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine, and the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder. After his conviction, the defendant filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the court of appeal. The petition claimed attorney incompetency
because the defendant's attorneys did not seek to suppress the gun as the fruit of the
unlawful seizure of the motel room. The court of appeal issued an order to show
cause in the lower court. The Orange County Superior Court denied the petition on
the basis that the gun would have been inevitably discovered. The defendant filed
a second petition for writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds. The court of
appeal granted the petition and set aside the conviction.
The court of appeal held that the motel manager's refusal to permit entry into
the motel room, upon instruction from the law enforcement officer, was an unlawful
seizure. The gun, therefore, was "the tainted fruit of this illegal seizure." The court
of appeal also held that the defendant was denied effective representation of counsel
because his attorneys did not challenge the propriety of the seizure. The Supreme
Court of California granted certiorari to determine whether the defendant's motel
room was illegally seized when the investigator instructed the motel manager to
refuse access to the room.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, holding
that the defendant was not denied effective representation of counsel because a
motion to suppress the rifle based on the seizure of the room would have lacked
merit, and therefore, the defendant's attorneys were not incompetent in failing to
raise the issue. The motion would have failed, the court said, because the seizure
of the motel room did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
Warrantless entry is typically illegal, with a few delineated exceptions. Some
courts permit the police to enter and secure a premises where there is probable cause
that contraband or evidence of a crime is present at the location, and exigent
circumstances indicate the evidence will likely be destroyed or removed. In this
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case, however, the police did not enter the motel room to secure it, but asked the
motel manager to refuse entry to any unauthorized person. This request and
subsequent obedience from the motel manager constituted a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment because it interfered with the defendant's possessory interest in the
room. A seizure is unlawful if it is unreasonable. The reasonableness standard
focuses on the nature of the interest upon which law enforcement officials
interfered.
The court found that the defendant had a possessory interest in the motel room,
but it was attenuated due to his arrest. The police did not restrict the defendant from
accessing the room. Instead, individuals given the defendant's permission were
denied entry. Furthermore, the seizure was temporary, and thus comparable to
situations where persons may be temporarily detained by law enforcement
personnel. Police officers need only "reasonable suspicion" to temporarily seize an
individual they suspect is involved in criminal activity. Circumstances where police
fear the imminent destruction or confiscation of evidence is analogous to the
situation where police are concerned with a fleeing criminal or with one about to
commit a crime. Accordingly, police officers need only "reasonable suspicion" that
contraband or crime evidence is on the premises to justify a limited interference with
one's possessory interest in a dwelling.
Allowing law enforcement officers to temporarily seize premises upon
"reasonable suspicion" preserves evidence and furthers the goal of the Fourth
Amendment: "to prevent the government from unnecessarily intruding on an
individual's privacy rights." A temporary seizure promotes this goal because it
prevents warrantless searches where there is no probable cause. However, if police
officers develop probable cause during the seizure, a warrant may be obtained to
lawfully search the dwelling.
The court's "conclusion [sought] to minimize the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests, while at the same time recognizing that the 'opera-
tional necessities' of police investigation justify a limited and temporary form of
seizure based on less than probable cause." The law enforcement officers' seizure
of the defendant's motel room, therefore, was reasonable. Additionally, the court
held that the eighteen hour seizure of the motel room was reasonable because the
defendant was in police custody, but reserved the question of whether such a period
of time would be reasonable if the occupant was not in custody.
Alternatively, the supreme court held that even if the seizure was unlawful, the
rifle would not have been suppressed because the police had an independent source
for discovery of the rifle. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the court held that the officers
searched the defendant's motel room under authority granted from a valid search
warrant that did not mention the seizure of the motel room. "[T]he warrant ... was
sufficient to dissipate the taint of any illegality." The fact that someone authorized
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by the defendant to enter the motel room to collect his belongings would have
prevented discovery of the rifle is not pertinent to the "independent source" doctrine.
The defendant's attorneys were, therefore, not incompetent in failing to raise
the issue of the motel room seizure in their motion to suppress the rifle.
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destruction of evidence).
Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1465 (1971) (advocating the impoundment of dwellings to prevent
the destruction of evidence).
PATRICIA CIRUCCI
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F. The trier of fact may consider an appellate opinion, in general, as part of the
record of conviction when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies under
the sentencing scheme at issue. The court must perform an ad hoc analysis based
on the facts of the case to determine the probative value of the appellate opinion.
People v. Woodell, Supreme Court of California, Decided February 11, 1998, 17 Cal.
4th 448, 950 P.2d 85, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241.
Facts. The California Legislature mandates longer prison sentences for individuals
with one or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, or "strikes." The State
of California convicted the appellant, Woodell, of burglary in the first degree.
During the trial, the prosecution offered documents stating the appellant's prior
record of convictions in the State of North Carolina, including an indictment and
guilty plea to assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The plea
agreement lacked many substantive facts of the crime. Normally the trial record
contains such facts. Over protest from the appellant, the court also admitted the
appellate opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals on the subsequent appeal
from the guilty plea to assault with a deadly weapon. The prosecution offered the
appellate opinion to show the appellant had personally used the deadly weapon, a
necessary statutory element to prove a prior strike when the conviction hails from
another jurisdiction. The jury found the appellant guilty of burglary and affirmed
the previous assault conviction as a strike. As such, the court sentenced the
appellant under a "prior strike" sentencing scheme and mandated the appellant to
prison for thirty-five years to life.
The appellant sought relief from the court of appeal, which allowed the
appellate opinion in the case at bar as a supplement to explain the indictment and
guilty plea. The court of appeal further determined that normally the prior record
of conviction would not contain the appellate opinion and thus could not be offered
by the State of California. The California Supreme Court granted review to consider
whether the record of conviction contained the appellate opinion.
Holding. Affirming the ultimate decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that the trier of fact may consider an appellate opinion, in
general, as part of the record of conviction when determining whether a prior
conviction qualifies under the sentencing scheme at issue. The court must perform
an ad hoc analysis based on the facts of the case to determine the probative value of
the appellate opinion.
Although the supreme court previously held that the trier of fact may look to the
entire record of conviction to determine the truth of the allegation, and that such a
rule applies to convictions from otherjurisdictions, the court never determined what
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composed the "entire record." The court analogized the case at bar with a recent
case to conclude that the entire record included the appellate opinion. The court
reasoned that the exclusion of appellate opinions would frustrate the court's goal of
efficiency. If the appellate opinion expedites justice then it should be admissible to
assist the trier of fact. In addition, the court noted that the inclusion of appellate
opinions would benefit the trier of fact to explain the previous conviction where the
trial record lacked crucial information, such as in the case at bar. The court also
recognized that not all appellate opinions would be probative as to a particular issue.
As such, the court explained that the trier of fact must perform an ad hoc analysis
of the facts to determine the probative value of the appellate opinion.
Consequently, the supreme court affirmed the ultimatejudgment of the court of
appeal. The court of appeal admitted the appellate opinion as a supplemental
explanation of the prior trial record but not because it concluded that the record
contained the appellate opinion. The court explained that such a holding failed to
follow common sense. The court noted that the appellate opinion often serves as the
definitive answer, affirming or reversing the trial court, to the truth of a previous
conviction. Thus, the record of conviction should logically contain all matters of
record, including appellate opinions, until the court reaches a final judgment.
Accordingly, the court rejected the appellant's argument to exclude the
appellate opinion when offering it to prove the truth of a prior alleged conviction.
The court reasoned that because the defendant possessed the power to offer the
appellate opinion to prove the decision invalid, the prosecution may offer the
appellate opinion as part of the record of conviction to prove the truth of a prior
conviction.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (a) (1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (stating that an
enhanced sentence shall be imposed if the individual has a prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (d) (2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (imposing a strike for
a previous felony conviction from another jurisdiction in which all of the elements
of the crime were the same in both jurisdictions).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1998) (determining that prior felony
convictions or pleas warrant the enhancement of sentencing).
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Case Law:
People v. Hazelton, 14 Cal. 4th 101, 926 P.2d 423, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (1996)
(discussing longer sentences for individuals convicted of previous serious or violent
felonies).
People v. Myers, 5 Cal. 4th 1193, 858 P.2d 301, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911 (1993)
(holding that People v. Guerrero applies to convictions from other jurisdictions).
People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 748 P.2d 1150, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1988)
(concluding that the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction to
determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation, but "no further").
Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2760 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing prior
convictions and the requirements needed to enhance sentencing).
22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3362-3391 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (generally
reviewing the enhancement of punishment for various crimes).
22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3380 (1985 & Supp. 1998) (discussing crimes
committed in other jurisdictions and the enhancement of punishment).
3 B.E. W1rKIN & NoRMANL. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for
Crimes § 1515A (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the three strikes law in
the context of prior serious or violent felonies).
3 B.E. WrrKIN & NoRMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for
Crimes § 1521 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (discussing convictions for prior
felonies committed in another jurisdiction).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion:
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 615 (1998)
(examining in-depth the history, application, and validity of California's three strikes
legislation).
Ilene M. Shinbein, Note, "Three Strikes and You Are Out": A Good Political
Slogan to Reduce Crime, But a Failure in Its Application, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 175 (1996) (discussing the application of three strikes
legislation in general and its apparent failure).
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return To Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997) (analyzing the history behind three strikes legislation and
the current state of the law in California contrasted with the law of various other
jurisdictions).
Keith C. Owens, Comment, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile
Mixture of Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the Criminal Justice
System and Bring California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 129 (1995) (discussing
California's three strikes law and the potential downfall of the state).
Mark W. Owens, Note, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require
Desperate Measures-But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881 (1995) (analyzing the legal
and economic ramifications of Penal Code section 667).
William M. Thombury, What Is the Meaning of Three Strikes and You Are Out
Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 303 (1995) (reviewing the application of
California's three strikes legislation).
JESSE CARYL
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V. DELINQUENT, DEPENDENT, AND NEGLIGENT CHILDREN
Courts have authority to create hearsay exceptions not established in the
California Code of Evidence; therefore, the "child dependency hearsay excep-
tion" created in a prior judicial proceeding is a valid exception to the hearsay
rule. However, this exception must be modified to include a valid determination
of reliability based on (1) an examination of the time, circumstances, and content
of the statement which might provide specific indicia of reliability, (2) an
opportunity for cross-examination of the child declarant or independent
corroboration of the statement, and (3) adequate notice of intended hearsay use
given to interested parties. Furthermore, a finding of testimonial incompetence
of the child is not a categorical bar to the admission of the child's prior statement.
In re Cindy L v. Edgar L., Supreme Court of California, Decided December 29,
1997, 17 Cal. 4th 15, 947 P.2d 1340, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803.
Facts. In August of 1994, proceedings were initiated pursuant to section 300 of the
California Welfare and Institution Code to have Cindy L. (Cindy), a four-year-old
girl, declared a dependant child of the court. These proceedings were initiated when
Cindy's preschool alerted the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family of possible sexual abuse. Yolanda Herrera, a teacher's assistant at Cindy's
school, testified that she noticed Cindy "lying on her back, with her legs spread open
touching her vagina underneath the side of her underwear using both hands."
Herrera further testified that she asked Cindy what she was doing and Cindy replied,
"my father always touches me right here." Cindy also made consistent statements
to two social workers and a police investigator. However, at the dependancy
hearing, Cindy was nonresponsive to questions and was not competent as a witness
because the court could not determine that Cindy possessed the ability to understand
the duty to tell the truth. Despite this finding of incompetence, the court determined
that Cindy's hearsay statements to Herrera were admissible in the hearing. Based
on this testimony, and a medical report filed by an examining physician that
corroborated Cindy's statements, the court determined that Edgar had abused Cindy
and that there was a risk of continued sexual abuse.
Edgar appealed and contended that use of hearsay statements under the "child
dependency hearsay exception" is inappropriate where the child is found incompe-
tent to testify at trial. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court's decision,
holding that "the child dependency . . . exception probes for unreflective and
spontaneous truth-telling, and is not founded on the declarant's regard for the duty
of truth-telling." The Supreme Court of California granted review to resolve two
issues: (1) whether the "child dependancy hearsay exception" created by the
judiciary rather than the legislature is a valid exception to the hearsay rule, and (2)
whether a finding that the child is incompetent is a conclusive bar to the admissibil-
ity of statements under this exception.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the "child dependancy hearsay exception" is a valid exception, and
that finding the declarant incompetent to testify at the dependancy hearing does not
bar admission of statements under the "child dependancy" exception.
In order to prove the validity of the "child dependancy hearsay exception,"
which was created in a prior judicial decision, the court turned to the language and
legislative history of sections 1200 and 160 of the California Code of Evidence. The
court noted that section 1200 states that "hearsay evidence is inadmissible '[e]xcept
as provided by law."' Because section 160 of the code defines the term "law" as
including "constitutional, statutory, and decisional law," the court concluded that
section 1200 granted courts authority to create exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
court supported this analysis by turning to the legislative history of section 1200.
Specifically, the court cited a comment on section 1200 adopted by the Senate
Committee.on the Judiciary that stated, "[o]ther exceptions [to the hearsay rule] may
be found in other statutes or in decisional law." The court determined that the
judicial power to create hearsay exceptions does exist.
However, the court warned that this judicial power should be employed with
caution. This power may only be used to create new exceptions upon a showing of
"substantial need." The court determined that the "child dependancy hearsay
exception" is valid because it is supported by substantial need. In light of the
difficulties in obtaining physical evidence or testimony in child abuse cases, the
court determined that this exception prevented the exclusion of "significant, reliable
evidence required for the juvenile court to assert its jurisdiction over the child and
to ultimately protect him or her from an abusive family relationship."
Although the court determined that this exception is valid, it noted that the
"child dependancy" exception "needs to be clarified and augmented in order to
better safeguard the reliability of a child's hearsay statements introduced in a
dependency proceeding." The court adopted three requirements for the admission
of hearsay statements in child dependency hearings: (1) the court must find that the
time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; (2) a child must either be available for cross-examination or there must
be evidence of child sexual abuse that corroborates the statement made by the child;
and (3) other interested parties must have adequate notice of the public agency's
intention to introduce the hearsay statement so as to contest it. The court determined
that if these three requirements are satisfied, then hearsay statements may be
admitted in dependency hearings under the "child dependency hearsay exception."
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. EvID. CODE. § 1200 (West 1997) (hearsay evidence is inadmissible "except as
provided by law").
CAL-. EViD. CODE. § 160 (West 1997) (defining meaning of the term "law" in code).
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, comment on Ass'm. Bill No. 3212 (1965 Reg. Sess.)
reprinted at 29B pt. 4 ANN. EvID. CODE (West 1995) ("other [hearsay] exceptions
may be found in decisional law").
Case Law:
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (describing factors to be considered in order
to make a determination of reliability in hearsay analysis).
In re Carmen 0., 28 Cal. App. 4th 908, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (1994) (creating the
"child dependency hearsay exception").
In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d 368, 795 P.2d 1244, 272 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990)
("hearsay exceptions may be found in decisional law").
People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868,389 P.2d 377,36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964) (using the
authority to establish new hearsay exceptions to admit statements against penal
interest).
Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3145-3146 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (generally
discussing exceptions to the hearsay rule).
21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3143 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (discussing hearsay
exceptions for declarations made by victims of crime).
31 CAL. JuR. 3D Evidence § 310.7 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (explaining that statements
of physical abuse are not inadmissible under the hearsay rule if certain requirements
are satisfied).
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2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 1053 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing
competency issues related to the testimony of children).
1 B.E. WrrKIN, CALwORNIA EVIDENCE, The Hearsay Rule § 711 (3d ed. 1986)
(describing exceptions to the hearsay rule in cases involving prior statements of a
sex crime victim).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Irene S. Kreitzer, Who Can Speak For the Child: Hearsay Exceptions in Child
SexualAbuse Cases, 13 CRIM. JUST. J. 213 (1992) (analyzing hearsay exceptions as
used in child abuse cases).
Krista MacNevin Jee, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have the Courts
and Legislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHIrTIER L. REV. 559 (Spring
1998) (focusing on the balance between the child's interest in abuse cases and the
interests of the accused as they relate to the admission of hearsay statements).
Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The
Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 207 (Winter 1995) (examining state approaches to admission of hearsay
in child abuse hearings).
John E.B. Myers, A Decade of International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse
Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward a Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J. 169
(Fall 1996) (examining global approaches to testimony of children in child abuse
cases and encouraging international reform based on a uniform child witness code).
Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (Summerl998)
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VI. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
The imposition of contempt sanctions against a parent who refuses to pay child
support is not a form of involuntary servitude proscribed by the United States
and California constitutions because requiring a parent to seek some sort of
employment does not bind the parent to any one type of employment or employer,
nor is the imposition of contempt sanctions for failure to pay child support
unconstitutional as an imprisonment for debt because failure to pay fails under
an implied fraud exception to the proscription against imprisonment for debt.
Moss v. Superior Ct., Supreme Court of California, Decided February 2, 1998, 17
Cal. 4th 396, 950 P.2d 59, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215.
Facts. In June of 1995, the defendant was ordered to pay his ex-wife child support
payments on a semi-monthly basis. After a year had passed, the defendant had
failed to pay twenty-four payments in the amount of $5,210. At the time the child
support order was made, the court was aware that the defendant was unemployed,
but based its support award on a projected monthly income of $1,671 per month.
On June 22, 1995, a contempt declaration was issued by the court for twenty-
four separate contempt violations, one for each missed payment. At the contempt
hearing, the defendant presented evidence of his inability to comply with the support
order, assuming that once any evidence of inability was raised, the burden would be
on the defendant's ex-wife to prove that the defendant could pay the support. The
ex-wife contended that inability to comply was an affirmative defense in.which the
defendant had the burden of proving that he was unable to comply.
The trial court held that the inability to comply with the support order was an
affirmative defense in which the burden of proving inability to comply was on the
defendant. The court also held- that evidence was presented to show that the
defendant did receive income from some source, and that the defendant's failure to
work did not indicate an inability to pay the support. Based upon this, the court held
that the defendant was able to comply with the support order and was guilty of the
twenty-four contempt counts.
Prior to sentencing, the court allowed the defendant to appeal the contempt
finding. The court of appeal stayed the appeal pending the trial court's imposition
of sentence. The trial court imposed sentence on six of the twenty-four counts,
imposing five days in jail and ten hours community service for each of the six
counts. The court of appeal then heard the defendant's petition. On appeal the
defendant argued that his ex-wife had failed to prove that he had any resources with
which to comply with the support order. The defendant also argued that a finding
of contempt may not be based on the defendant's ability to earn, citing the
487
longstanding rule that forcing a party to seek employment to pay court-ordered
support is a form of involuntary servitude barred by the United States and California
constitutions. The court of appeal overruled the trial court, holding that the
defendant could not be held in contempt of court based upon his ability to earn. The
California Supreme Court then granted review to determine if a finding of contempt
for failure to pay court-ordered support is constitutionally impermissible if that
finding is based upon the parent's ability to earn.
Holding. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal, but
overturned Exparte Todd, 119 Cal. 57, 50 P. 1071 (1897), the longstanding case
holding that forcing a party to seek employment to pay court-ordered support is a
form of involuntary servitude impermissible under the United States and California
constitutions. The court held that requiring a person to comply with court-ordered
support by holding that person in contempt was not a form of impermissible
involuntary servitude.
The court reasoned that the obligation of a parent to pay child-support is not
comparable to involuntary servitude. Moreover, the court recognized that the United
States Constitution did not proscribe enforced labor as punishment for a crime. The
court also reasoned that the duty to pay child support was an obligation as important
as compulsory military service or jury duty.
The court also reasoned that a court requiring a person to seek some sort of
employment to pay a financial obligation does not rise to the level of involuntary
servitude because it imposes no control on the type of job that person seeks or with
whom he is employed. The court further reasoned that a person who is obligated to
seek employment to pay a court-ordered financial obligation is not only free to seek
how and with whom he is employed, but also to quit his employment at any time to
seek employment elsewhere. The court concluded that such freedoms were not
indicative of involuntary servitude.
The court also held that a contempt penalty based upon a party's inability to pay
court ordered child support was not an impermissible imprisonment for a debt. The
court reasoned that a contempt order based upon an inability to pay child support
was a criminal contempt penalty, invoked specifically for the party's failure to yield
to the court's authority. The court noted that imprisonment for failure to pay a debt
was barred by the United States and California constitutions, but imprisonment for
a crime was permissible.
In analyzing whether the contempt order was an imprisonment for a debt or
imprisonment for a crime, the court reasoned that, in the specific case, the
defendant's failure to seek employment was a willful attempt to avoid compliance
with the court's order. Such a willful defiance was a form of implied fraud. The
court reasoned that the contempt order was to punish the defendant for his implied
fraud, and was therefore criminal rather than an imprisonment for a debt. The court
also held that the inability to pay is an affirmative defense to a contempt charge, and
thus the defendant carries the burden of proving his inability to pay the court-
ordered support.
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However, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal, holding that its
overturning of Todd was prospective because both lower courts had relied on Todd
as controlling with regard to child-support orders at the time of their rulings. The
supreme court also held that the defendant had no notice that Todd was not
controlling, and thus had failed to even attempt to prove his affirmative defense of
inability to pay.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1209 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (defining conduct that will be
considered contempt of court).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1218 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (defining the maximum penalty
for a single contempt violation as a fine of no more than $1000 or five days
imprisonment, or both).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1218.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (allowing the court to find
non-paying support parents in contempt of court for each month they fail to pay
support).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 290 (West 1994) (enabling a court to enforce its orders through
contempt penalties).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (allowing the court to consider
the income of a support-paying parent's spouse where the support paying parent
intentionally reduces income by quitting work or by failing to seek employment).
CAL. PENALCODE § 166(a)(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (defining conduct which
will be considered criminal contempt of court).
Case Law:
Exparte Todd, 119 Cal. 57, 50 P. 1071 (1897), overturned by Moss v. Superior Ct.,
17 Cal. 4th 396, 950 P.2d 59, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (1998) (holding that the court
cannot compel a man to seek employment in order to pay child support).
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Ex parte Karlson, 160 Cal. 378, 117 P. 447 (1911) (holding that where a fine is
imposed as a punishment for contempt, the court has the power to enforce its
payment by imprisonment until paid, and the imprisonment may exceed five days).
H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954) (stating that
statutes authorizing fines or imprisonment as penalties for contempt establish limits
within which courts may punish contempt).
Morelli v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 328, 461 P.2d 655, 82 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1969)
(defining the nature of contempt penalties such that where the object of the contempt
penalty is to protect the rights of the litigants, it is to be considered a civil penalty,
but where the object is to protect the dignity or authority of the court, it is to be
considered a criminal penalty, regardless of whether it arose in a civil or criminal
case).
Legal Texts:
1 CAL. JUR. 3D Actions § 19 (1996) (generally discussing the classification of
contempt as criminal or civil).
14 CAL. JuR. 3D Contempt § 20 (1974) (generally discussing what constitutes a
separate act of contempt).
14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contempt § 32 (1974) (generally discussing when inability by a
party to comply with a court order will disqualify a party from being charged with
contempt).
14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contempt § 44 (1974 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing the
limitations on contempt penalties).
19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1747 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
what constitutes criminal contempt).
1 B.E. WrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction to
Crimes § 13 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998) (defining contempt proceedings as quasi-
criminal proceedings).
2 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against
Governmental Authority § 1141 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998) (generally discussing
contempt).
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
Sean Arther, Civil Procedure; Violation of Contempt Orders, Attorney's Fees, 26
PAC. L.J. 332 (1995) (discussing amendments to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1218
allowing courts to assess against persons found in contempt fees above the statutory
$1000 limit).
Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 41 (1998) (generally discussing enforcement of parental duties to children
through child support laws and contempt penalties).
Stacey A. Kielma, Civil Procedure; Contempt Orders, 25 PAC. L.J. 461 (1994)
(discussing amendments to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1218 calling for fines in excess
of the statutory $1000 in contempt proceedings when community service is ordered
as part of the contempt penalty and the fines plus the community service administra-
tive fees exceed $1000).
Ilse Nehring, "Throwaway Rights": Empowering a Forgotten Minority, 18
WrnrrIER L. REV. 767 (1997) (generally discussing the legal and moral duty of a
parent to support a minor child, and specifically discussing the rise of the parental
rights movement).
JOSHUA DALE
VII. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
A jury's role in a trial for breach of an implied employment contract, where the
employee can be discharged for good cause only, is to decide whether the
employer acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing
misconduct occurred.
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., Supreme Court of California, Decided
January 5, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 93, 948 P.2d 412, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900.
Facts. Defendant, Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc. (Rollins), fired Ralph
Cotran, the plaintiff, as senior vice-president and western regional international
manager of Rollins' West Coast international office. Defendant fired Cotran
following an investigation of allegations that Cotran had sexually harassed two
employees. Based on the investigation and interviews with Rollins' employees,
Susan Held, Rollins' manager for equal employment opportunity compliance,
concluded it was more likely than not that the sexual harassment occurred. Fred
Feldman, Rollins' president, fired Cotran based on Held's investigative report, and
on affidavits of employees.
Cotran claimed that Rollins breached an implied employment contract not to
terminate employment except for good or just cause. Rollins defended the claim on
the ground that Rollins' decision to terminate Cotran was reached honestly and in
good faith. The trial judge rejected Rollins' defense and stated that the case was
basically a contract dispute and that Rollins must prove that Cotran actually
committed the acts. Therefore, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine
whether the acts of sexual harassment actually occurred. The jury determined that
the sexual harassment did not occur and thus returned a verdict for Cotran. The
court of appeal reversed and the California Supreme Court granted review to
determine the jury's role in an action for breach of an implied agreement not to be
dismissed except for "good cause" when the employee was dismissed for miscon-
duct.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the jury's role in an action for breach of an implied contract not to
be dismissed except for "good cause" was to "assess the objective reasonableness
of the employer's factual determination of misconduct." Therefore, the court held
that the jury's role is not to determine whether the misconduct actually occurred, but
rather, whether the employer's decision to terminate was based on "fair and honest
reasons .... that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs
or goals ......
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The court reasoned that in determining whether good cause exists, there must
be a balance between an employer's interest in efficient personnel decisions and an
employee's interest in continuing employment. A jury does not have the requisite
knowledge of the everyday realities of the workplace because of the jury's relative
remoteness from the everyday realities of the workplace. If an employer were
required to have a written confession or an eyewitness account of the misconduct,
then the workplace would turn into an "adjudicatory arena." Consequently, the
supreme court rejected the trial judge's ruling that a breach of an implied employ-
ment contract not to be dismissed except for "good cause" is a contract issue and
therefore the defendant must prove the misconduct occurred. The court explained
that to require an employer to prove that a misconduct actually occurred would in
turn hamper the employer's ability to run an efficient and profitable business.
Accordingly, the supreme court stated that the case should be retried and that
the critical question for the jury was whether at the time the defendant made the
decision to terminate Cotran, the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing
Cotran had sexually harassed the other employees based on an appropriate
investigation.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. LABOR CODE § 2924 (West 1989) ("Employment for a specified term; grounds
for termination by employer").
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3005 (West 1989).
Case Law:
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(holding that a jury's role is to decide whether an employer acted with "a fair and
honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith").
Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal. 4th 454, 904 P.2d 834, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
427 (1995) (stating that reasons that are "trivial, capricious, unrelated to business
needs or goals, or pretextual" are not good or just cause for termination).
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276 (Or. 1982) (holding that absent
an implied or express agreement that the employer contracted away its fact-finding
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prerogative to determine whether just cause exists for termination of employment,
the court will not infer it).
Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 901 P.2d 693 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting the argument that the
jury should review de novo the factual basis for an employer's decision to terminate
for just cause).
Legal Texts:
29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer & Employee § 59 (1986) (generally discussing discharge
of an employee).
29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer & Employee § 62 (1986) (generally discussing grounds
for discharge of an employee).
29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer & Employee § 64 (1986) (discussing the requirements
for an employment contract for termination based on good cause).
2 B.E. WrTiUN, SUMMARY of CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 156 (9th
ed. 1987) (generally discussing discharge of employment for cause).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY of CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 184E (9th
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1998) (discussing theories for an action for wrongful termination
based on breach of an implied in fact contract).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Gary Trachten, Wrongful Termination Claims: What Plaintiffs and Defendants Have
To Know, 581 PLI/Lrr 9 (1998) (discussing the meaning of good cause in
employment contract context).
Rod M. Fliegel, Comment, Reflections on California's "At Will" Employment
Agreement Jurisprudence, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1996) (discussing
termination of employment based on good cause).
Michael D. Fabiano, Note, The Meaning of Just Cause for Termination When an
Employer Alleges Misconduct and the Employee Denies It, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 399
(1993) (examining what a private employer must demonstrate in order to lawfully
terminate a just-cause protected employee).
Wendi J. Delmendo, Comment, Determining Just Cause: An Equitable Solution for
the Workplace, 66 WASH. L. REV. 831 (1991) (discussing the need to adopt a
standard that requires a jury to balance employer and employee interests).
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Carl F. Schwarze, Comment, Understanding the Just Cause Defense, 65 U. DET. L.
REV. 527 (1988) (discussing the definition of just cause in wrongful discharge
cases).
ANN KIM
VIII. INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND COVERAGE
Site investigation expenses constitute defense costs that the insurer incurs in
fulfilling its duty to defend if: (1) the site investigation is conducted between
tender of the defense and conclusion of the action; (2) the site investigation
constitutes a reasonable and necessary effort to avoid or at least minimize
liability; and (3) the site investigation expenses are reasonable and necessary for
that purpose. Additionally, defense costs may be allocated to the insured if the
costs related to a claim that is not even potentially covered under the insurance
policy.
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., Supreme Court of California,
Decided December 29, 1997, 17 Cal. 4th 38, 948 P.2d 909, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118.
Facts. Through the course of Aerojet-General Corporation's (Aerojet) operations
from the 1950s through the 1980s, Aerojet discharged hazardous substances into the
environment. Since 1979, three actions instituted by either the United States or the
State of California and 35 actions instituted by private parties were brought against
Aerojet. Each action alleged that Aerojet's continuous discharge of hazardous
substances polluted the surrounding environment and resulted in bodily injury
and/or property damage.
From 1956 to 1975, Aerojet had comprehensive general liability insurance
policies (commonly known as standard commercial general liability insurance
policies) issued by various insurers, providing coverage for specified harm including
bodily injury and/or property damage. From 1976 to 1984, Aerojet was covered by
"fronting policies" issued by Insurance Company of North America (INA),
providing that there was no duty on the part of INA to indemnify or defend. In
1982, Transportation Indemnity Company and Associated International Insurance
Company (collectively Transportation Indemnity) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief against various other insurers and their common insured, Aerojet, regarding
the parties' rights and duties under the comprehensive general liability insurance
policies. Specifically, Transportation Indemnity sought a declaration that it was not
obligated to provide, nor was Aerojet entitled to receive, either indemnification or
defense costs. Aerojet filed a cross-complaint against Transportation Indemnity and
the other insurers (collectively the insurers), seeking declaratory relief. Later, in an
amended cross-complaint, Aerojet sought a declaration that it was entitled to receive,
and the insurers were obligated to provide, both indemnification and defense costs.
The trial court determined by jury that: (1) the insurers had no duty to indemnify
because Aerojet intended or expected the harm caused by the pollution, (2) site
investigation costs did not constitute defense costs, and (3) defense costs were
allocated to Aerojet for the eight year period Aerojet was covered by the INA
"fronting policies." The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's holdings that the
insurers had no duty to indemnify and that defense costs incurred after Aerojet was
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covered by fronting policies were properly allocated to Aerojet. However, the court
of appeal reversed the lower court's judgment with respect to its determination that
none of the site investigation costs were defense costs. The California Supreme
Court granted review to determine: (1) whether site investigation expenses may
constitute defense costs properly attributable to the insurer in fulfilling its duty to
defend, and (2) whether defense costs may be allocated to the insured.
Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal
to the extent that it held that: (1) site investigation expenses may constitute defense
costs that the insured must incur as a result of its duty to defend under the
comprehensive general liability insurance policies and (2) defense costs might be
allocated to the insured under such policies. However, the California Supreme Court
reversed the lower court ruling to the extent that it held that defense costs should be
allocated to the insured based on the time the "fronting policies" were in effect.
With respect to the site investigation expenses, the supreme court reasoned that
under comprehensive general liability insurance policies, the insurer has a duty to
defend the insured in any action brought against the insured that seeks damages for
a covered claim. Because the insurance policies at issue covered harm for bodily
injury and/or property damage, the court reasoned that site investigation expenses
that include costs for determining the existence, nature, and effect of the harm
caused by the discharge of hazardous substances may properly be defense expenses
that the insurer must pay under its duty to defend. Therefore, the court determined
that site investigation expenses constitute defense costs that the insurer incurs in
fulfilling its duty to defend if: (1) the site investigation is conducted between tender
of the defense and conclusion of the action; (2) the site investigation constitutes a
reasonable and necessary effort to avoid or at least minimize liability; and (3) the
site investigation expenses are reasonable and necessary for that purpose.
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the court of appeal to determine if all
of the stated requirements had been met, thereby creating an obligation on the part
of the insurers fo pay such defense costs.
Additionally, with respect to defense costs that may be allocated to the insured,
the supreme court held that defense costs that can be allocated to a claim potentially
covered, or at least partially covered, under a comprehensive general liability
insurance policy cannot be allocated to the insured. Furthermore, the burden of
proof is on the insurer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defense
costs are properly allocated to the insured. Because the claim at issue alleged that
Aerojet continuously discharged hazardous substances that resulted in bodily injury
and/or property damage, the court reasoned that the claim is at least potentially
covered by the comprehensive general liability insurance policies. Therefore, the
court concluded that the burden is on each of the insured to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the claims presented by the federal government, the State
of California, and the private parties were not even potentially covered by the
insurance policies. The court clearly held that if the specified harm may have
potentially been caused, at least in part, within the insurer's covered policy period,
the insurer has a duty to defend for all such periods during which the harm may
possibly have resulted thereafter. Consequently, an insurer could only allocate
defense costs to Aerojet for any part of the claim involving acts or omissions
resulting in bodily harm or property damage caused either before the specific
policy's inception or after the specific policy expired. Furthermore, the court
determined that Aerojet's subsequent policy with INA in no way affected the
insurers' obligations to Aerojet under their policies. The court remanded the case
to the court of appeal for such determinations.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (a) (1) (1994) (the federal government may request or require a
site investigation).
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1994) (when the federal government conducts a site
investigation, the insured may be compelled to reimburse the government for the
expenses incurred).
Case Law:
Buss v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 4th 35, 939 P.2d 766, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1997)
(holding that when an action in which some of the claims are potentially covered by
the policy and some are not, the insurer has a duty to defend the entire action).
AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1990) (holding that the cost of site investigation expenses constitutes damages).
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiralty Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 4th 287, 861" P.2d 1153, 24
Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1993) (holding that an insurer's duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnify).
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)
(concluding that an insurer is required to defend any claim where potential liability
exists under the policy).
Legal Texts:
39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 555 (1996) (generally discussing an
insurer's duty to defend).
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39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 561 (1996) (discussing when an insurer's
duty to defend is terminated).
39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 556 (1996) (discussing determination of an
insurer's duty to defend).
6 B.E. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1136 (1988 & Supp. 1998)
(generally discussing the scope of an insurer's duty to defend a claim).
6 B.E. WrriN, SUMMARY OFCALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1142B (1988 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing reimbursement of the insurer from the insured for uncovered claims).
6 B.E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OFCALIFORNIALAW, Torts § 1142C (1988 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing the Aerojet decision and its holding that site investigation expenses may
constitute defense costs).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Eileen B. Eglin and Stephen D. Straus, Classifying RI/FS Costs Under A Policy Of
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance: Indemnity Or Defense?, 5 FORDHAM
ENv'T. L.J 385 (1994) (discussing an insurer's duty to defend under a comprehen-
sive general liability insurance policy and the issue of whether site investigation
costs may be included as defense costs).
Mark C. Raskoff, Arguments Advanced By Insureds For Coverage Of Environmen-
tal Claims, 22 PAC. L.J. 771 (1991) (discussing the scope of an insurer's duty to
defend).
John H. Reaves, The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 17 CAL. LAWYER 54 (1997)
(discussing the allocation of defense costs between the insurer and the insured).
Douglas R. Richmond, Comment, Issues And Problems In "Other Insurance,"
Multiple Insurance, And Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (1995) (analyzing
the different types of insurance policies).
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Joseph S. Stuart, Comment, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information:
What Does A California Lawyer Need to Know?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547
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IX. MUNICIPALITIES
California Vehicle Code section 40200.5(a), prohibiting the contracting of
parking violations to another city processing agency in an outside county, is not
violated when the outside agency simply contracts to provide limited service
assistance. In order to be prohibited by section 402005(a) as a processing
agency, the issuing agent must transfer a "comprehensive package of responsibili-
ties" to the outside agency.
Lockheed Info. Management Serv. Co. v. City of Inglewood, Supreme Court of
California, Decided January 8, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 170, 948 P. 2d 943, 70 Cal. Rptr.
2d 152.
Facts. A private bidder, Lockheed Information Management Services Co.
(Lockheed IMS), which submitted a bid for a services contract to process parking
tickets for the City of San Diego (in San Diego County), brought suit to enjoin the
City of Inglewood (in Los Angeles County) from submitting a bid. Lockheed IMS
claimed that Inglewood's bid violated the "within the county" provision of the
statute, citing California Vehicle Code section 40200.5(a), which allows a parking
violation "issuing agency" to "contract with the county, with a private vendor, or
with any other city or county processing agency... within the county, ... for the
processing of notices of parking violations and notices of delinquent parking
violations."
Inglewood claimed that the service the city provided' was simply a computer
program that facilitated the processing of data by allowing San Diego to use the
Inglewood computer system, but required San Diego to enter the actual data into the
system. Inglewood claimed in the preliminary injunction hearing at the trial level
that its proposed contract with San Diego did not violate section 40200.5(a) because
San Diego "remained responsible for all 'due process' and 'public relations' aspects
of ticket processing, including physical collection of cash payments, receipt and
handling of inquiries from ticket recipients, and administrative disposition of
contested citations." The trial court denied a preliminary injunction and Lockheed
IMS appealed.
The court of appeal reversed, finding that even Inglewood's limited activities
in its proposal for services fell under the plain meaning of the word "processing,"
and so violated section 40200.5(a). Finding it likely that Lockheed IMS would
succeed on the merits, the court of appeal granted the preliminary injunction. The
California Supreme Court granted review to consider whether Inglewood's bid for
parking citation management services violated section 40200.5(a) of the Vehicle
Code.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that Inglewood, as a local government agency, had power independent
of section 40200.5(a) to contract with other local governmental agencies. The
supreme court further held that in Inglewood's proposal to provide parking services
to San Diego, Inglewood did not assume the responsibility of a "processing agency"
and so did not violate section 40200.5(a).
The court first heldthat absent any restriction imposed by section 40200.5(a),
Inglewood was within its municipal powers when it proposed a contract for services
with San Diego. The court looked to Government Code section 54981, which
allows "any local [governmental] agency to contract with any other local [govern-
mental] agency" for municipal services and other public contracts. The court stated
that this code section, which gives express authority to local governmental agencies
to receive services, also implicitly gives authority to those agencies who wish to
provide municipal services. The court concluded in its finding in this regard that
section 54981 gives authority to local governmental agencies to contract with other
agencies for municipal services unless otherwise prohibited by law.
The court, in deciding whether Inglewood was a "processing agency" for
purposes of section 40200.5(a), entered into a lengthy discussion of the legislative
history and procedural processes by which municipal authorities have administered
parking violations since the section was first made law in 1980. The court found
that the Vehicle Code section which requires the processing agency to be within the
county of the issuing agency contemplates only a "particular form of agreement..
• [which] historically included almost every pre-judicial activity required for the
administration and disposition of parking tickets ......
The court stated that in order to be contracting out to a "processing agency" for
purposes of section 40200.5(a), the issuing agency (San Diego) must "transfer this
comprehensive package of responsibilities from itself to another entity." The
comprehensive package includes: "administration and disposition of parking tickets,
including functions, such as the physical receipt of fines and penalties, the handling
of motorist inquiries, and the investigation and resolution of contested citations..
.. The court concluded that Inglewood's proposal to enter into an agreement with
San Diego for limited service assistance allowed San Diego to retain the basic
processing responsibilities and therefore did not violate the Vehicle Code. Finally,
the court found that Inglewood's proposed limited service arrangement did not give
Inglewood any of the independent discretionary authority that the Vehicle Code's
provision requiring the processing agency to be within the county was designed to
protect against.
In finding that Inglewood's proposal for services did not qualify as a
"processing agency," and that Inglewood had other statutory authority as a local
agency to contract with other local agencies, the court reversed the court of appeal's
finding of preliminary injunction.
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (gives cities power, in city
charters, to exclusively control those issues which are "municipal affairs").
CAL. VEH. CODE § 40200 (West Supp. 1998) (explains authority of municipalities
to issue parking violations; procedural requirements).
CAL. VEH. CODE § 40200.5(a) (West 1998) (giving issuing agency of parking
violations election of contracting with the county, a private vendor, or any other city
or county processing agency within the county).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54981 (West 1997) ("the legislative body of any local agency
may contract with any other local agency for the performance by the latter of
municipal services or functions within the territory of the former.").
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254.9 (West 1995) (authorizing local or state agencies to sell,
lease, or license computer software that it has developed).
Case Law:
Board of Trustees v. Municipal Ct., 95 Cal. App. 3d 322, 157 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1979)
(explaining the procedural history of how municipal cotirts removed themselves
from the parking violation system making parking violations civil in nature).
County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra, 27 Cal. 3d 184, 612 P.2d 24, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 440 (1980) (construing the revenue-sharing relationship between cities and
counties regarding parking violations).
Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961) (construing
parking meter regulation to be a matter of state-wide concern and not a matter of
"municipal affairs," so that cities do not have exclusive control over regulation of
parking meters).
Legal Texts:
56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 493 (1971 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
generally the power of municipalities to contract).
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45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 322 (1978) (discussing the authority of cities to
contract with each other).
45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 314 (1978) (discussing a city's power to contract
in general).
4 B.E. WrriN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Parking and
Registration Display Violations § 1961 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing vehicle parking
and registration display violations).
8 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Matters of Statewide Concern,
Constitutional Law § 804 (9th ed. 1988) (general discussion of California law
regarding municipal authority and issues of statewide concern).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of
Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643 (1993) (discussing the
allocation of governmental power between state and local entities including recent
developments).
Carol Robertson Boman, Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v.
County of Sonoma: The Contract Clause and Home Rule Powers Revitalized in
California, 68 CAL. L. REV. 829 (1980) (discussing the debate over the boundaries
of "municipal powers" against issues of state-wide concern).
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X. PARENT AND CHILD
Pursuant to Probate Code section 6454, the estate of a decedent may pass to a
foster child or stepchild if the foster or step relationship began during the child's
minority and continued through the joint lifetimes of the decedent and child and
if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the child would have
been adopted but for a legal barrier which began during the child's minority and
continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the child and the decedent.
Estate of Joseph, Supreme Court of California, Decided January 12, 1998, 17 Cal.
4th 203, 949 P.2d 472, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619.
Facts. Pursuant to section 6400 and following sections of the Probate Code, a
deceased parent may pass his or her estate by intestate succession to his or her child
as heir. Section 6454 of the Probate Code, unique to the State of California,
provides that the parent-child relationship exists between an individual and the
individual's foster parent or stepparent if: "(a) [t]he relationship began during the
person's minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the
person's foster parent or stepparent, and (b) [i]t is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the
person but for a legal barrier."
Louis Joseph died intestate. The petitioner sought a ruling from the probate
court pursuant to Probate Code section 6454, claiming she was the deceased's
daughter and sole heir, and was thus entitled to the deceased's entire estate. James
C. Joseph, respondent and decedent's brother, opposed. The petitioner, Kim
Barnum-Smith, was supported and cared for from age three by the deceased, Louis
Joseph, and his wife, who predeceased him. The Josephs financed the petitioner's
college education and "gave" her away at her wedding. The relationship between
the Josephs and the petitioner "satisfied the common law definition of foster child."
While the petitioner was a minor, the Josephs repeatedly asked the petitioner's
natural parents for permission to adopt her. Each request was denied. Eventually,
during the petitioner's minority, the Josephs' requests to adopt the petitioner ceased.
The probate court held that the relationship of parent and child, as defined in
Probate Code section 6454, did not exist between the decedent and the petitioner.
As a result, the petitioner was denied her claim to the decedent's estate. The court
of appeal affirmed, concluding that while the petitioner established a "continuing
relationship" between the deceased and the petitioner lasting throughout their joint
lifetimes, a legal barrier to her adoption by the Josephs did not persist throughout
the lifetimes of the petitioner and the deceased, rendering the petitioner's claim as
daughter and sole heir to the decedent's estate untenable. Rejecting the holding in
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Estate of Stevenson, 11 Cal. App. 4th 852, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1992), in which
the sixth district held that the "legal barrier" to adoption need only exist at the time
adoption was attempted or contemplated, and instead adopting Division Five of the
Second District's holding in Estate of Cleveland, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1700, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 590 (1993), the court of appeal required that the adoption barrier exist
during the child's minority and that it continue throughout the child's and foster or
stepparent's lifetimes. The Supreme Court of California granted review to
determine the legislative meaning and purpose for section 6454's requirement of
clear and convincing evidence of adoption but for a legal barrier.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the Supreme Court of
California concluded that the holding in Estate of Cleveland embraced the proper
interpretation of Probate Code section 6454, requiring the adoption barrier's
existence during the child's minority and its continuation through the child and
stepparent's joint lifetimes.
The supreme court took a literal approach to section 6454 by adopting its
definition that step and foster children are heirs only when they would have been
adopted "but for" a legal barrier. If, at some point before the death of the parent, the
legal barrier no longer existed, it would cease being the "necessary cause of the
failure to adopt." Accordingly, with the legal barrier no longer a bar to adoption, the
failure to adopt would result only from a lack of intent by the parent to follow
through with the adoption process. The supreme court reasoned that if an intent to
adopt no longer existed, "it would signify that what might once have approached a
parent-child relationship ... might well have suffered a 'change in [its] nature or
quality' in the interim .... " By requiring a continuing barrier and implying a
lifetime intent to adopt, the supreme court reasoned that in the instance when a legal
barrier has existed until death, "the failure to adopt would not imply the nonexis-
tence of a parent-child relationship; it would be coterminous with the inability to
adopt because of law. There would then be a kind of parent-child relationship that
would be tantamount to that of adoption." Accordingly, in these instances, the foster
or step child would become an heir to the parent.
The court identified the major purposes behind the Probate Code as efficiently
and expeditiously passing the estate according to the intestate decedent's intent, and
held that the Cleveland court's interpretation of Probate Code 6454 furthers these
objectives. The court reasoned that if a parent declined to adopt a child in the
absence of a legal barrier, the parent's intent to devise his/her estate would most
likely be non-existent.
Applying Probate Code section 6454 to the facts in the case at bar, the petitioner
did not dispute that a legal barrier did not persist throughout the joint lifetimes of the
deceased and the petitioner. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeal's decision, finding that the petitioner was not the daughter of the deceased
under section 6454, and was therefore not entitled to his estate as sole heir.
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REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West 1991) (the estate of a deceased parent may pass by
intestate succession to his child or heir).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 1999) (relationship of parent and child exists
between a person and the person's foster parent or stepparent if there is a continuing
relationship and "but for" a legal barrier the child would have been adopted).
Case Law:
Estate of Cleveland, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1700,.22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (1993) (holding
that Probate Code section 6454 requires the existence of a legal barrier to persist
throughout the joint lifetime of a step or foster parent and a step or foster child).
Estate of Stevenson, 11 Cal. App. 4th 852, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1992) (holding that
the legal barrier requirement of Probate Code section 6454 need only exist at the
time adoption is attempted or contemplated).
Legal Texts:
12 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAFoRNA LAW, Wills and Probate § 152, 153B
(9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the parent and child relationship and the
provision for inheritance by a step or foster child).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Margaret M. Mahoney, Step Families in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills,
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989) (discussing Probate Code § 6408, predecessor
and identical to Section 6454, detailing the evidence necessary to prove a parent-
child relationship).
Thomas M. Hanson, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: California Leads the
Way, But Has it Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (1995) (examining the
restrictive reading of Probate Code section 6454 by the Cleveland court vis-a-vis the
more liberal reading by the Stevenson court, giving rationale for why a liberal
reading is more desirable).
Ralph C. Boshman, Children & Inheritance in the Non-traditional Family, UTAH L.
REV. 93 (1996) (discussing the shortcomings of Model Probate law and its failure
to provide guidelines governing the inheritance rights of children outside the
traditional nuclear family, including a discussion of novel California Code section
6454).
Ronald R. Volkman, When are Step Children Heirs of Stepparent?, 23 ESTATE
PLANNING 253 (1993) (discussing the absence of a provision in Uniform Probate
Code for step and foster children to become heirs, including a discussion of Probate
Code section 6408, predecessor and identical to Probate Code section 6454).
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XI. UNFAIR COMPETITION
A private for-profit corporation may maintain, on behalf of the general public,
an unfair competition action against a retailer who, in violation of Penal Code
section 308, sells cigarettes to minors. Such actions are permitted under the
Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17209.
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., Supreme Court of California,
Decided February 23, 1998,17 Cal. 4th 553, 950 P.2d 1086, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731.
Facts. Lucky Stores, Inc., along with various other retailers located in Northern
California, sold cigarettes to minors in direct violation of section 308 of the Penal
Code. Stop Youth Addiction (SYA), a California for-profit organization, brought
an action in the public interest against Lucky Stores. SYA sought $10 billion in
restitution to be paid to the State of California, an injunction enjoining Lucky from
selling cigarettes to minors, costs, and attorney fees.
The Superior Court of California sustained Lucky's general demurrer, stating
that section 308 preempted private enforcement of such suits. The court of appeal,
relying on prior case law, reversed. The Supreme Court of California granted
Lucky's petition of review to determine the sufficiency of SYA's complaint.
Holding. The Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Penal Code sections 17200 -17209,
defines unfair competition as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." This law
encompasses all business practices.
Lucky impliedly conceded claims under sections 17200-17209. However,
Lucky argued that SYA' s suit was barred by the UCL because SYA lacked standing;
Lucky argued that section 308 barred SYA's suit because section 308, along with
the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement Act (STAKE), embodied the
legislature's intent to create, within section 308, an exclusive and exhaustive scheme
for enforcing the law prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors. Moreover, Lucky
asserted public policy considerations against allowing private enforcement of the
sale of tobacco to children.
Lucky asserted that only public prosecutors can enforce the statute. However,
the California Supreme Court denounced this theory, citing case law and the statute
itself as justification for the proposition that SYA did indeed have standing. The
court stated that the issue regarding the source of UCL standing was affirmatively
argued and decided in the prior cases. Additionally, neither Penal Code section 308
nor the STAKE Act contain any express reference to the UCL. Furthermore,
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sections 17200 and 17203 of the UCL expressly state that "any unlawful business
practice... may be redressed by a private action charging unfair competition." The
court noted that had the legislature intended to change the UCL to prohibit
enforcement by private actors, the legislature could have, and would have, done so.
Indeed, the UCL maintained its language through several sessions in which
amendments of the UCL were proposed; the legislature had rejected several pieces
of legislation aimed at narrowing, broadening, or banning UCL standing toward
private actors.
The court pointed to the history of California's unfair competition statutes as
further justification for the proposition that "any person" may bring a civil action in
the effort to enforce the penal law. Similarly, the court determined that the absence
of an express provision within section 308 or the STAKE act, providing for private
enforcement, was not meant as an implied bar against private action of these
statutes.
The court further reasoned that section 308 and the STAKE act did not intend
to repeal other state statutes. Rather, the legislature clearly stated its intent that the
provisions of the UCL were to be cumulative as considered against other remedies
and penalties. Private UCL action that "borrows violations" from section 308, in the
attempt to establish predicate unlawful business activity, is not barred. The court
noted that the SYA did not allege a private cause of action under section 308; it only
"borrowed" its violations as unlawful practices independently actionable under
section 17200. Thus, the SYA based its suit on the remedies of the UCL.
Lucky argued in favor of an implied repeal of the UCL' s broad standing provision
by the STAKE Act and section 308. However, the court rebuked Lucky's argument,
stating that the acts were not irreconcilable, were clearly repugnant, and were
inconsistent-the requirements for a successful argument of implied repeal. As such,
the court determined that it was bound to "maintain the integrity" of each statute
involved. Thus, the three statutes involved coexist. It is not inconceivable, in any
context, that a single crime can trigger violations of more than one statute.
Lucky also asserted public policy considerations as a rationale in favor of its
argument against private standing. Lucky argued that putting a public prosecutor's
discretionary decision-making within the control of an "interested" party, who has
no involvement in criminal prosecutions, would put prosecutors in the position to
accept "an inappropriate financial benefit." However, the court found that SYA had
no affiliation with any government agency and SYA had requested that any proceeds
recovered in the suit be delivered directly to the State of California.
Lucky also alleged that SYA was bringing the suit in its own interest because
SYA was seeking recoupment of its attorney fees. The court dismissed this concern,
pointing to the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions against
frivolous lawsuits brought in bad faith. Also, attorney fees are only rewarded to a
party if it actually wins the case. As such, any motivation to file a frivolous suit is
adequately policed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Even more, from the economi-
cal perspective, the court noted that it is not within the court's power to determine
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whether the policy of a statute is economically sound or beneficial; this is the job of
the legislature.
Lucky further argued that public confidence in the legal system would be
undermined if "private bounty hunters" were allowed to try cases involving the
Penal Code, usurping the "essential neutrality" required of a prosecutor. Once
again, however, the court sided with SYA in regard to the asserted public policy
consideration. The court noted that allowing for private enforcement of the UCL,
in this instance, would even the playing field, forcing Lucky to compete fairly with
other law abiding retailers. Private enforcement promotes: the achievement of the
public policy goals underlying the initial enactments of section 308 and the STAKE
Act.
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In the context of workers' compensation, an employer's insurer is subrogated to
the employer's contractual rights and duties when the insurer stands in the
employer's shoes in litigation; thus where an insurer initiates litigation against
a third party, the third party has a right to recover attorney fees from the insurer
based on the terms of the contract executed by the employer and the third party.
Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Supreme Court
of California, Decided March 2, 1998, 17 Cal. 4th 632, 951 P.2d 420, 71 Cal. Rptr.
2d 851.
Facts. A construction worker, George Staehling, fell down a flight of stairs while
working at a building site for a subcontractor, PDM. As a result of his injuries in
the accident, Staehling received workers' compensation benefits from PDM's
insurer, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin (Wisconsin).
Additionally, Staehling filed suit against Tutor-Saliba, the general contractor of the
project, and Cowelco, the subcontractor responsible for installation of the stairs.
Wisconsin intervened in Staehling's suit against Tutor-Saliba and Cowelco to
recover compensation benefits Wisconsin paid Staehling. All claims were settled
and dismissed prior to trial with the exception of Wisconsin's reimbursement claim
against Tutor-Saliba and Cowelco. The trial court found that PDM's contributory
negligence accounted for more damages than Wisconsin paid out in benefits, and
thus Wisconsin recovered nothing in the suit against Tutor-Saliba and Cowelco.
Tutor-Saliba filed a memorandum to recover attorney fees from Wisconsin
pursuant to a provision in Tutor-Saliba' s contract with PDM. The contract provision
provided attorney fees to the prevailing party in the event of litigation. The trial
court denied the motion for attorney fees because it found that Tutor-Saliba was not
the prevailing party in the suit. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of attorney
fees, focusing on the unique context of workers' compensation law. The court did
not address whether Tutor-Saliba was the prevailing party in the suit. The California
Supreme Court granted review to address the issue of whether attorney fees were
available to the general contractor from the subcontractor's insurance carrier
pursuant to a contract provision between the general contractor and the subcontrac-
tor.
Holding. Reversing and remanding the decision of the court of appeal, the
California Supreme Court unanimously held that a contract provision for attorney
fees in a contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor made
attorney fees available to the general contractor where the insurer stood in the shoes
of the subcontractor.
While workers' compensation benefits limit an injured worker's remedy against
the employer, neither the worker nor the employer is so limited in pursuing recovery
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from a negligent third party. Employers may purchase insurance to cover potential
workers' compensation liability. The insurer may pursue reimbursement for benefits
it pays out to injured workers. The decision to pursue reimbursement from other
liable parties is at the discretion of the insurer. The insurer is subrogated when it
stands in the shoes of the employer in litigation against the third party. Thus, the
insurer assumes both the rights and liabilities of the employer.
The court noted that the insurer's subrogation flows from the employer, not from the
injured worker. As an example, the court pointed out that the employer, not the
injured worker, may seek reimbursement for workers' compensation benefits from
the third party. The insurer, therefore, also has the right to pursue reimbursement
against the third party because its subrogation flows from the employer rather than
from the injured worker. Just as an insurer's rights flow from the employer's rights,
so too do the insurer's obligations flow from the employers' obligations. Thus,
Wisconsin's duty to pay attorney fees depended not on the injured worker's duty to
pay attorney fees, but rather on the insured employer's contractual duty. The court
reasoned that the insurer voluntarily pursues reimbursement and must weigh the
risks of litigation accordingly. The court urged that subrogation is a right, not an
obligation. Where an insurer affirmatively subrogates itself to an employer, it
acquires both rights and responsibilities. As a result, PDM's contract provisions
with Tutor-Saliba bound Wisconsin when Wisconsin stood in PDM's shoes in
litigation with Tutor-Saliba. Therefore, an attorney fees provision in the contract
would bind Wisconsin upon a finding that Tutor-Saliba was the prevailing party.
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